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



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
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
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
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A
SKETCH
OF THE
MILITARY AND POLITICAL POWER
OF
RUSSIA.



W. H. Freeman.

SKETCH

OF THE

MILITARY AND POLITICAL POWER

OF

R U S S I A,

IN

THE YEAR 1817.

By Sir Robert Thomas Wilson.

SERPENS NISI SERPENTEM COMEDERIT—NON SIT DRACO.

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P R E F A C E.

THE tranquillity of Europe was the profess-
ed object and promise of the belligerent system
pursued for twenty-five years by the British
Cabinet: a tranquillity, not such as Tiberius or
Sylla conferred on Rome, when the oppressed
and the wretched were denied the utterance of
their griefs, but one which should be the fruit
of a policy conciliating the public feeling, and
associating to its support the wise and the good
of all countries—a tranquillity, which should
possess the principles of self preservation, by
connecting the powerful and the weak, the con-
quering and the conquered, in bonds of com-
mon interest.

It would be a mockery of the public under-
standing to enter into an elaborate discussion

for the purpose of proving, that this pledge has, in no one instance, been redeemed.

Where is that peace accompanied with the blessings of peace?

What injuries have been redressed by a disinterested act of justice?

What passions have been appeased by the generosity of power?

The eye of the most resolute is daunted at, the flashes of popular indignation—The throes of suffering humanity are accompanied with an expression of despair so fearful as to make foolish men to think, and thinking men to tremble.

“We have suffered affliction without gaining wisdom,” and, severe as the late struggles have been, there is too much cause to apprehend “our warfare is not accomplished”—that

there may be other struggles, which, if once begun, can admit of no compromise, since former disappointment will animate the contending parties with an unrelenting ferocity, susceptible of no mitigation.

The author, however, does not propose to notice more of the *moral* state of Europe, than is necessary to establish his position, that *Russia, profiting by the events, which have afflicted Europe, has not only raised her ascendancy on natural sources, sufficient to maintain a preponderating power, but farther, that she has been presented by her rivals with the sceptre of universal dominion.* Bold as this position may be thought, the prediction of such an event was made when the horoscope of Russia, to common observers, did not appear so fair. The prediction, nevertheless, has been so closely verified, that the extract will engage interest.

“ When the Czar and the Consul draw forth their legions in hostile array, mediation, armed

coalitions, neutral conventions, and *demarcation lines*, will be of little avail. These powers have long been unused to cabinet warfare, and to courtier *etiquette* in the field.

“The intervention of other states may *hasten* their own subjection, but cannot ward off their fate. The chieftains of Russia and France will meet nearly on the centre of the world the object of their quarrel will not be a bishopric, a sugar island, nor who shall read their mass in Latin, or say their prayers in Greek—they will fight for the possession of the Hellespont and Bosphorus, two posts on which hangs *now* suspended the *empire of our Eastern Hemisphere*. Such contending parties will not come out to skirmish and then mutually retire, nor will they fight for conquests to give away; the one will keep the field, and with it the *Dictatorship of the World*!*”

* “Sketches on the intrinsic Strength, Military and Naval Force, of France and Russia.” 1803.

Some political Hectors have thrown down the gauntlet, as if they were prepared to oppose attitude to attitude, and force to force—As if a power *really* existed to repress or punish any and every attempt to remove a neighbour's landmark.

The hour of illusion is, however, passed, and mankind are no longer the dupes of big or fair words. That belief, that faith, which was indulged after reason had ceased, is finally exhausted; and, though Don Sebastian, or Joanna Southcote may still live in the credulity of their followers, although Mahomet might yet attract multitudes to see him put the mountain in march, or bottle conjurors again levy a fine on London's curiosity, Englishmen will no longer be persuaded by ministers to shut their eyes, as witless children, and catch at fruit, which, when caught, is

Like the apple on the Dead Sea's shore,
All ashes to the taste.

The vessel of the state was committed to the guidance of fortune; wisdom and experience pointed out the dangers of the course, and foretold, that, if she escaped shipwreck on the voyage, her damage from the conflicting currents would be greater than the profits of the venture could repair.

The artist, who in anger dashed his brush against the canvas, might as well have claimed merit for design and execution—the Athenian tanner might, with as much justice, have presumed to hang up his shield in the temple of Minerva, to commemorate the triumph at Pylus, as the British ministers arrogate to their councils and deliberations the issue of the contest against France. They reeled to and fro like drunken men, and having obtained a fortuitous success—a success which verified the philosophical maxim, that “events often justify foolish conduct”—they expected *the same chance* would also make them statesmen, and add “the governing mind” to her gifts.

Financial difficulty was the inevitable consequence of a war policy ; yet peace might have been established on such foundations, that governments and nations would have united in the spirit of peace.

England devoted all her resources to remove the danger of *one* domineering rival, France ; but Russia, profiting by the occasion, mounted to a higher pinnacle than that rival ever reached ; while America, nourished by the war system, became a naval power, threatening to take her station on the high seas, and throw a boom composed of her ships of war across the channel of communication with the Indies.

In addition to these, what may be called preternatural, creations, impregnated with active life fatal to England's continental ambition, and alarming to her maritime superiority, France herself, shorn but still terrible, has been rendered malevolent to the highest de-

gree, and offers her embraces to whoever will assist her revenge.

Instead, therefore, of the *one* original rival, England has to contend against *three* rivals, aided by the unfriendly spirit pervading the universe.

Notwithstanding all the *feu de joies* she has fired, such is the state of her foreign relations; and the domestic picture is no less alarming; while her enemies, aware of her condition, do not seem inclined to neglect the opportunity for the accomplishment of her ruin.

How just is that observation,

Principis est virtus maxima nosse suos;

and how greatly does that ruler wrong himself, who, with a natural benignity and a generous education, with endowments and acquirements eminently calculated to obtain public favour and affection, nevertheless lends his ear

to evil counsellors, and thus impairs his popularity, by permitting measures subversive of that constitution he would defend, and destructive of that national prosperity it is his interest as well as disposition to promote.

There is in this work no pretension to publish new facts: to relate truth, with regard to those already known, and nothing but the truth, is the sole object. More information, perhaps, might have been given, to elucidate and confirm several assertions; but the inviolability of confidence imposes paramount restraints.

Kings, ministers, statesmen, and generals, may be pleased or displeased—the historian, who would instruct, must reject all partiality and animosity: he must say *Tros*, *Tyriusve*, &c. But as it is not probable that he should avoid giving offence, when executing the duties of a public writer, and recording transactions, which require an impartial sentence of approbation or of animadversion to stamp their character,

and affix the judgment of the passing age, he must be prepared to encounter the resentment of power, wounded in its pride, and of criminality writhing under rebuke.

These are times, when those, who would save their country, must put themselves in the breach, without any regard to personal safety, and be prepared to exclaim, with the Roman orator,

Quinetiam corpus libenter obtulerim si repræsentari morte meâ libertas civitatis potest, ut aliquando dolor populi Romani pariat quod jamdiu parturit.

It may be said, that, with such feelings and such a vaunt of them, the name of the author also should appear inscribed on the title-page; and so it would have appeared (notwithstanding the *ignotum pro magnifico* is frequently favourable), if the etiquette of literary combat with an anonymous champion did not prescribe the use of a closed vizor; but no other motives

have withheld the signature ; and so far from seeking concealment, or proposing to fight under false colours, the author holds himself always ready to maintain against adverse *compeers*, in the broad face of day, all those statements, allegations, and opinions, which his pen has traced in these pages.

All attempts to influence the judges are illegal, and indicative of a bad cause or base fear ; but still, the hope may be stated, that critical eyes will be blind to imperfections of style and diction : the manner sues for lenity—the matter challenges award.

S K E T C H,

&c. &c.



AN Extraordinary Article has appeared, under the head of *Frankfort*, accompanied with some Observations which authorise attention.

The whole article is here inserted, as the basis of that inquiry and those reflections which follow :—

“ It seems to be necessary, that Europe should be acquainted with her danger. The danger does not and will not come from England, or from France, or from Austria. It will come from the North—from Russia. Russia is the power which is desirous of assuming the high and dic-

tatorial attitude which France assumed under the tyranny of Bonaparte. It is on this account she did every thing in her power to prevent the intimate alliance between England and the Netherlands, by a marriage between the two families, and to connect the House of Orange with the imperial family of Russia. It is for this purpose she brought about the marriage of the King of Wurtemberg with the Duchess of Oldenburgh. It is for this purpose she is connecting herself also by family ties with the House of Brandenburg. It is with this view that she does not view with much displeasure the charges of foreign libellers against England, because they may tend to weaken the esteem and respect for that great nation; or those constant attacks upon the government of France, which may tend to keep up alarm and apprehension in the interior of that country. She relies upon alienating England and France from each other, by encouraging reciprocal jealousies and ill will."—*Frankfort.*

"We are disposed to give the Frankfort writer credit for the sincerity of his fears; but we own we do not share them, nor do we contemplate affairs in the same point of view. In the first place, he relies too much upon the operations and effects of family alliances. The experience of all history shows us how feeble they are whenever they at all clash with any favourite plan of policy, of ambition, or aggrandisement. We know not, and care not, what influence Russia had, or whether she had any, in

breaking off the intended marriage between the families of Brunswick and of Orange; because the union between the families of Brunswick and of Saxony has given perfect satisfaction to the people of this country; and surely no prince could have been selected, whose conduct could have been more highly praiseworthy than the conduct of the Prince of Saxe Cobourg. The opinion we have given, of the effect of marriages in general between sovereign families, will apply to the other marriages the Frankfort Correspondent has alluded to. Wurtemberg indeed! What effect can she produce, or what weight can she have in the scale of European policy? With respect to the charges of foreign libellers against England, we are not astonished at them, because they come from notorious jacobins; nay, we are willing to go farther, and assert, that we have deserved it at their hands. We put them down, and their libels and calumnies are the natural offspring of revenge and disappointment. But we have often been surprised at the impunity and asylum that were so long afforded them. Surely no power in Europe is under greater obligations to England than the government of the Netherlands. It was the influence of this country, in a great measure, that combining the United Provinces with the Netherlands, established the family of Orange upon a powerful throne:—one of the wisest strokes of policy that could have been

devised. It seems to us to be absurd to suppose, that the kingdom of the Netherlands could give into any views of aggrandisement which Russia might have, or enter into any offensive treaty with her, against France and England: for such a policy would *combine both* against her. And what efficacious service could Russia, so distantly situate, render her? Besides, it is to be considered, that the development of such a policy would not be viewed with indifference or inertness by Austria. And in such a state of affairs as that to which the Frankfort Correspondent alludes, it would not be difficult to find employment on the side of Turkey. But we repeat, that we consider the fears of the Frankfort Correspondent as chimerical. We do not believe Russia to have any such intentions. That, which in all former times was deemed improbable, is now not only probable, but apparent and extant. England and France have discovered it to be their interest to be firmly and cordially united; and we, perhaps, do not hazard much in affirming, that there are no two courts in Europe between whom a better understanding subsists, Austria is united to both with the same cordiality and intimacy. *And now we should be glad to ask, what could any other power, or all of them together, effect against the union of Great-Britain, Austria, and France?* The peace of Europe is not likely to be soon disturbed. No power has any motive in

disturbing it : all have powerful motives in preserving it."—*London.*

There is an old French proverb "*qui s'excuse s'accuse*," and certainly Russia must regard this gratuitous publication of opinions hostile to her professions, and of admonitions insulting to her power, as a proceeding indecorously expressive of jealousy and apprehensions.

To imagine enmity, and then threaten control or correction, is not merely antipacific but offensive. Schoolboys, when a battle is *to be got up*, are made to say to some pitted champion, "I heard you wanted to bully me: I don't believe it; but if you did I would give you a good drubbing." The same spirit of resistance animates them when men, and the threat exasperates more according to the pride of station.

Nations as well as individuals are sensible to those voluntary taunts. What Englishman has forgotten the sensation which Napoleon's remark, that "England could not contend

against France *single-handed*," diffused through the people he proposed to humiliate?

The subject, however, shall be investigated, as the preliminary indiscretion has been committed; and, by a dispassionate, correct review of the state of Europe, it will be demonstrated, that the folly of provocation is augmented by the total want of means to sustain the challenge.

For this purpose it will be necessary to enter into some sketch of the Russian European history.

Little more than a *century* since, the ground on which Petersburg stands was an uninhabited morass, and all the surrounding country was under the dominion of Sweden, then in alliance and territorial connection with Poland, a kingdom containing above seventeen millions of inhabitants, and Turkey, whose power was so formidable as to make Peter the Great, after his victory at Pultawa, capitulate on the Pruth, ransom his liberty with

his wife's jewels, and repay tribute to the Tartars.

The ambition, the talents, and the fortune of Peter the Great prevailed, and the maritime capital was established on a scale, which formed a monument of his glory, and at the same time afforded the best security for perseverance in his audaciously boasted policy, "Nature has made but *one* Russia, and she must have *no* rival*."

The succeeding sovereigns, till the reign of Catherine, with the exception of Elizabeth, whose treaties were honorable and war glorious for the character of her armies, although unsuccessful to Russia, did not extend his impulsion; but they laboured to consolidate the dominion he had acquired, and commerce provided additional means for the accomplishment of their views.

* Vide Peter the Great's Speech, after the defeat of the Swedish fleet near the island of Aland, in the year 1714.

Catherine the Second felt all the ardour of a conqueror, and inspired her subjects with the same sentiments. In an empire where solid education had been always neglected, and which Catherine herself sacrificed for more attractive accomplishments, the most able ministers, and invincible generals, presented themselves as by enchantment.

The Caucasus, the Crimea, the Cossack country, Courland, and a great part of Poland, were added to her possessions ; yet Suwarrow never could bring into the field *an army of forty thousand* effective men.

The frame of the edifice was immeasurably vast ; but the interstices, or chasms, were also of frightful dimensions. The scaffolding continued to stand, according to the design of the original architect, but an uninterrupted series of skilful combinations was necessary to complete the plan, which his genius had traced.

Poland was a central bulwark ; which, by connecting Stockholm and Constantinople, and indenting itself into the Russian military

line of defence, rendered successes obtained, still precarious, and a subjugated people, restless subjects. Favourable moments were seized. The most important position in Europe for her preservation was occupied (two great European powers assisting, whilst the others remained supine spectators ;) and a warlike independent nation, which formed the garrison, was partitioned as lawful spoil amongst the pretended guardians "of her safety and tranquillity."

The wise and liberal policy of Catherine, with regard to religious toleration, and the maintenance of laws, customs, and language, enfeebled the resentment of the people, who fell to her lot, and founded in *all* that preference for her government, which has given to later acts the colour of a voluntary association with her empire.

The real object of Catherine's ambition being Constantinople, she limited her hostility against France to the issue of a few manifestos, some munificent pecuniary presents to

the dethroned and expatriated dynasty, and the gift of a sword to Monsieur, who, Colonel Vauban relates, according to his own and Prince Esterhazy's opinion, "received it as if he was determined never to use it*."

Paul, more ingenuous and less of a politician, carried his promises into execution. *Thirty-six thousand* men, under Suwarrow, marched into Italy, where they sustained the reputation of their chief; whilst *eighteen thousand* men landing at the Helder under untoward circumstances, depreciated the military estimation of Russia below its just standard. Disappointed and exasperated, Paul resolved to coalesce with his former foe, and turn his arms against former friends. With this view a maritime confederacy was formed, and a considerable corps of cavalry was collecting for the invasion of India, when a dis-

* Memoires pour servir a l'Histoire de la Guerre de la Vendée, par Monsieur le Comte de Vauban, page 24. "Il a reçu cette épée comme un homme qui ne s'en servira pas."

contented nobility and harrassed soldiery interposed to terminate his reign.

Paul was violent and capricious ; but his enemies say, that " although he wanted judgment to shield his country from injury, he had too exalted a mind ever to have subscribed to her disgrace."

His reign was too short for the development of the even then exuberant resources of his empire ; but it had an important influence on the European branch of Russian policy, by showing, that every part of Europe was accessible to armies brought from the Caucasus and Siberia ; whilst his project of penetrating through Persia to the Indies, rejected as wild and visionary at the time, has been gradually and seriously engaging the attention of the government and obtaining the sanction of those destined to be the executors of this enterprise.

Alexander came to the throne with strong predilections in his favour—Real personal good qualities had gained the affections of all who

approached him ; and, as the pupil of La Harpe, expectation was raised high as to his capacity for government. The "Telemachus of the North" was not then inebriated with power; but, instructed in his duties by a Mentor endowed with intelligence and virtue, exercised the authority of a despotic sovereign to establish philanthropy as the basis of his throne*.

An enemy to the costly vanities of some of his predecessors, he regulated the expenses of his palaces with economy, and applied his treasures to the foundation of useful establishments, the promotion of useful public works, the equipment of his arsenals, and the augmentation of his army—Temperate, active, and indefatigable, he transacted the business of government through direct correspondence or personal superintendence ; and, familiar

* Vide the Ukases, respecting the condition of the slaves—their non-transfer by sale from the land—the abolition of the punishment of death—the rare punishment of the knout, &c. &c.

with the statistics, topography, and interests of the various people inhabiting his extensive empire, he cherished the general prosperity by a polity adapted to the wants of *each* and *all*.

Such *was* Alexander : the same fidelity of description shall represent him as *he is* ; since the individual character of an autocrat, whose *will* is the only *professed* principle of government, must always have paramount influence on the measures of his cabinet.

Alexander had no alternative but to make peace with England : it was indeed the implied condition of his succession. His feelings were in unison with his obligations, and he profited by the improvement of his finances, to bring into action many sources of wealth and strength, which had been heretofore unemployed.

Notwithstanding a never-ceasing wasteful expenditure of men and money on the Persian and Moldavian frontiers, his dock-yards were constantly adding to his navy, and his depôts advancing newly-formed battalions.

Involved, as an ally of Austria, in the disaster of the battle of Austerlitz (a battle precipitately resolved on, and lost, it may be truly said, before the combat began, by an injudicious flank movement), Alexander himself perhaps was the only man of his army, who did not descend the Carpathian mountains despairing to retrieve the misfortunes and disgrace of that campaign. Exertions were multiplied, according to the exigency; and when Napoleon passed the Rhine to attack Prussia, *one hundred and twenty thousand* Russians were advancing to her support.

The battle of Jena, which in one day overthrew the Prussian monarchy, and in fourteen days advanced the French standards to the Vistula, disconcerted the intended operations, and threw Russia upon the defensive on her own frontier, with only *five or six thousand* dispirited auxiliaries, which had escaped the wreck, instead of the *two hundred and forty thousand* men, who, a few days previously, had been arrayed to co-operate with her.

The battles of Pultusk, of Eylau, of Heilsberg, and Friedland, could not (or rather, in *one instance*, that of Eylau, *did* not) prevent the enemy's successive approach to the Niemen; and Alexander, alarmed at his situation, accepted the conditions of peace that Napoleon offered, and which *he* not only rendered *advantageous to Russia*, but *embellished with circumstances of respect* to the sovereign, that soothed the feelings of disappointment and defeat.

The unsuccessful issue of Sir George Duckworth's expedition, and the result of the *unauthorised* movement of the British troops from Alexandria on Rosetta (for the enterprize against Alexandria itself was undertaken at the express suggestion of the Russian cabinet) had certainly much chagrined Alexander, and given such an accession of force to the Turks, as to oblige the march of reinforcements to that frontier, when they could not be spared without danger to other points of great interest: but the *real* motive, which disposed him to peace, was a conviction, from a short residence at the army, that it was too *weak in numbers*, and

too *disorganised*, from want of *elementary* arrangements, to defend from invasion the provinces of Poland incorporated in Russia, where a spirit of insurrection was to be apprehended; whilst he knew that the succours, announced as on march, were not in existence, and that there were not *twenty thousand* men in reserve to cover *both* his Capitals.

Peace, which restored a throne to his ally, although some of the richest jewels of the crown remained in possession of the invader, diminished much of the personal regret, which Alexander had felt as a man for the issue of the war—Peace, which gave him a farther portion of Poland, which sanctioned his views in Turkey, as far as the Danube, and the conquest of the important province of Finland, was favourable to his general policy; but peace, which gave him *time*, and by which he was resolved to profit, was, with the experience which he had acquired of the imperfections of his military system, of still greater, and, as he said himself, “*of the greatest value.*”

The attack on Copenhagen, which Alexander always declared to be unjustifiable (as the then Crown Prince of Denmark had determined on maintaining the strictest neutrality, and resisting any infraction *whatsoever*, whether from the land or the sea), afforded him the pretext for declaring war against England; a policy in which he persevered, notwithstanding circumstances were recalled to his mind, calculated to deter him from carrying into execution so unpopular a measure.

The seizure of Finland was most unjustifiable; but the acquisition was of the same importance to Russia, as Normandy, under English dominion, would be to France. The consequent dethronement of the then reigning dynasty in Sweden was never anticipated by Alexander, and will always be deplored by him, until the injury is compensated either by indemnity or restoration.

Napoleon, having again invaded Austria, to punish equivocal negotiations, when he was

embarrassed, after the battle of Eylau*, as well as to anticipate hostile arrangements in progress, summoned Russia as an auxiliary to invade Austria on the side of Galicia. Her armies overran that province, and advanced to Olmutz, when the Austrian cabinet resolved on peace, and agreed to give a *pledge* of permanent friendship—a pledge, which Russia is believed to have declined to give after the peace of Tilsit.

Peace again added to the Russian empire an extensive and important district of territory; and, although it has since been relinquished, its reoccupation awaits but the *convenience* of the Emperor.

The defence of Galicia is as impossible, since Russia has the Duchy of Warsaw, *six hundred thousand* men to act *with*, and a friendly population to march *on*, as the maintenance of the country between the Vistula and the Niemen,

* Napoleon said to the Austrian general sent to reconnoitre his force and situation, and who did not arrive until after the danger was passed, "Go back and tell your master he is two months too late, I am now ready."

now under the Prussian dominion, would prove to be, if Russia should ever resolve on its possession, unless Prussia negotiated cession and indemnity.

A *strong English party* continued to exist in Russia ; and the commercial interest, which embraces the interest of a great part of the Russian nobility, murmured loudly at the detriment occasioned to their fortunes, and therefore to the general prosperity of the empire, by the English maritime blockade. Still Alexander persisted ; but, bearing in mind the impressions of the campaign on the Vistula, he applied himself unremittingly to improve the administration of the army, as well as to the increase of its numbers.

Napoleon, who had expected and hoped the Turkish war would have exhausted the treasure and military resources of Russia, or at all events have prevented the growth of her disposable force, saw with astonishment and apprehension the result of Alexander's administrative measures.

In three years Russia had lost, of her Moldavian armies, by climate rather than by the sword, *thirty-six* generals, and an *hundred and twenty thousand* men. Still an army of *sixty thousand* strong, better equipped, organized, and disciplined than Russia ever before had, and which equalled, perhaps *exceeded* in general composition any army in Europe, was stationed on the line of the Danube, and occasionally blockaded the Turkish army in Schumla (at the foot of the Balkan mountains) the rampart of Constantinople—a rampart, which a general like Napoleon would long since have prostrated by his genius and kindling spirit of enterprise.

The Persian war had consumed annually from *ten to twenty thousand* men; but every year improved the Russian lines of communication, and gradually weakened the Persian frontier.

Instead of one feeble army to guard the Niemen, *one hundred and eighty thousand* men were formed in three lines to repel any attack, and *another* considerable body of troops was station-

ed in Finland; all the *arsenals* were full of stores—*fifteen hundred* pieces of cannon were in the field—*recruits* were training in every province—and a *militia* was instituted through the whole empire.

Napoleon, who had never forgotten the battle of Eylau, and the martial qualities of a Russian army, saw the time was come when Russia was either to assume that attitude, which was the object of *his* ambition, a settlement in Europe which from the *strategical* properties of her position and numerous population assured her the command of the continent, or, that she was to be dislodged, broken, repelled, and reduced, until she became again little more than an Asiatic power. He selected that moment to commence his operation, because he feared Russia might prevail on the Turks to make peace, and that England would acquire more influence from her good offices on that occasion; perhaps, also, he had *good reason* to suspect, that the character of the protracted war in Spain was reviving the hostile feelings of un-

willing allies, and connecting them in alliances of reciprocal resistance and support.

In opposition to the advice of many of his best officers and statesmen, he refused to send *eighty thousand* more men to complete the conquest of the Peninsula, and disgust the English nation with continental wars by a failure of hopes so highly excited, and so expensively supported. He always replied, that it was most judicious to leave the English army engaged in a country remote from one, where, in his view, they might more efficaciously contribute to the prejudice of his interests.

At the head of a *confederate* army of above *four hundred thousand* men, Napoleon accused Alexander of a violation of treaties, and demanded their renewal.

The issue of the campaign is well known; but the real history of all the transactions, although so interesting to the statesman, the soldier, the philosopher, and all others who have

the feelings of humanity, is yet withheld from the world.

Here may it only be put on record, that, notwithstanding the unexpected conclusion of peace between Turkey and Russia, and the improbable hostility of Sweden, *the gigantic project of Napoleon was executed in all those parts which opposed, as had been presumed, insurmountable obstacles to his success.*

By the occupation of the line of the Dwina and the Dniester, he had rendered the re-establishment of Poland an *optional* measure; and his advance on Moscow, which vanity dictated, to commemorate the glory of the conquest, was an operation, that could have been attended with no *disaster*, or even *inconvenience*, if political speculation had not induced a continuation in that capital beyond *twenty* days.

There can be no desire to exalt the reputation of Napoleon, or disparage, if it were possible for detraction to do so, the valour of the heroic army and brave people opposed to him;

an army, to whose devotion Napoleon himself has paid the highest tribute, when he describes the battalions, writhing under his fire, "as unwilling to go, and yet unable to remain:" but the fact is, that from want of energy in the direction of the Russian operations, and a determination not to make a *concentrated and general attack on the enemy's line of march*, the French army would have regained their position on the Dwina and Boristhenes, without any serious injury, had it not been for a sudden intense frost, and a total neglect to provide horseshoes suitable to the climate, excepting for Napoleon's own horses, which General Caulincourt saved by the precaution*.

Once again established on this line, the winter might have been passed in perfect security, since Austria would have been awed into

* During the retreat a ducat, then worth one pound sterling, was, with thanks, the price of a single horseshoe, even in the Russian army. But the Russian horses in their own country are always rough shod, that they may be prepared for the frost.

effective co-operation, and all the resources of Poland would have been brought into action for the ensuing campaign.

Never was there any campaign in modern history, where each adversary had such frequent opportunities to obtain *certain victory*, and assure *total destruction* to the attacked, without any risk, and scarcely any loss to the aggressor.

Fluctuation of councils, at the instant of operation, caused the evacuation of the extensive entrenched camp of Driessa, &c., and the relinquishment of the extensive country between the Niemen and Dnieper, or Boristhenes, almost without a conflict.

After the battles of Smolensk, (in which the Poles greatly distinguished themselves by their daring lodgment in the suburbs), and the *voluntary* evacuation of that city, on which the enemy had not made the *slightest* impression to *oblige* the surrender, nor any movement which *necessitated* the retreat of the supporting army, the Russian force, embarrassed in a cross road

with *six hundred* pieces of cannon and the passage of a river, had not been able to gain the Moscow high road, and deploy out of a narrow defile, in which it was moving with difficulty, when a part of the French army, having already crossed the river*, approached that point or outlet of the pass which alone permitted the debouchement† of the Russian column: the duke of Abrantes (Junot) paused; when within half a mile, afforded time to the Russians to bring up some scattered detachments to the point of danger‡, who maintain-

* The corps of Bagrathion, having escaped by most extraordinary exertions, and some fortune, from the army under Davoust, detached to intercept him, had been stationed at this passage, and received an order to retire on Dorogobusch, without a corps being instructed, as was intended, to replace his corps, and cover the operation of the oblique march.

† There is no English military term equally expressive; it signifies, "coming out of the mouth."

‡ The Duke of Wurtemberg, uncle to Alexander, by his exertions on this occasion, was thought to have contributed very much to the safety of the Russian army; whilst the valour of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, his nephew, who commanded a corps, on all occasions added to its honour.

ed the position in spite of all succeeding efforts; and thus lost, as Napoleon truly said, "the most propitious moment of his (the Duke's, and, it may be added, of Napoleon's) life."

At Borodino, as at Waterloo, lines were opposed to lines, man to man, and the appeal was made to each individual soldier's courage: the issue depended upon the exertion of power rather than the delicacy of manœuvre or the caprices of fortune; the example of the chiefs, the charge, the storm, the repulse, and the stand, were the only tactics; the cross fire of cannon the only operations of strategy. But after a retreat, rendered necessary by the loss of the battery which commanded the whole left and part of the centre of the position; after the capture of Moscow, accompanied with transactions and events of the deepest interest, of which the world is still ignorant, when for *twelve* days the Russian army was revolving round the smoking ruins of their capital, to regain the Kaluga road, disconnected in line of march, embarrassed with

every possible incumbrance*, and checked by every species of impediment; in this situation, the columns presented a *flank* to the concentrated French army, and offered them an infallible victory.

After the battle of Mariolawitz, so glorious to Prince Eugene and his Italian army, without being prejudicial to the honour of the Russian troops engaged (for the grand army, although within *three* miles at *ten* in the morning, was pertinaciously kept from affording any succour until *four* in the afternoon); if Napoleon had, on the *second* day, pushed on his *advanced guard*, instead of making an oblique movement to regain the Moscow and Smolensk road, the whole Russian army, in obedience to its *orders already given*, would have retired behind the Oka, and left a rich country, and a *secure* line of march in whatsoever direction Napoleon might choose to re-enter Poland.

* From Smolensk the whole population of the country, about to be abandoned by the troops, put their women, children, and principal effects in their carts (of which each peasant has at least one), and joined the columns, adding to the confusion and the wants. The army at last became a wandering nation.

On the other hand, at the battle of Tarrutina, prior to that of Marioslawitz, where Murat (as he stated in his report, under the presumption of a tacit suspension of hostilities) allowed himself to be surprised, not a man of his army could have escaped, if the operations under General Beningsen, who had pierced *five* points of his line of communication, had been supported *actively* by the *sixty thousand* men, moving in parade order, within cannon shot.

At Weismar, where, for a long day, Milera-dowitch, with *one* corps, encountered and finally obtained considerable success over *three* corps of the French army, whilst the main Russian army was *bivouaqued* within hearing even of the fire of the small arms, and not distant four hours' march for infantry—the French army might have been ruined.

At Krasnow, where the Russian army, *one hundred and ten thousand* strong, was posted, with a powerful cavalry and artillery, drawn up in battle array, and remained quiet spectators of the French army filing along its front for twenty-four hours, until almost the rear

of its rear guard was retiring*—the war might have been terminated.

Beningsen, Strogonoff, and Gallitzin, indeed, when they did commence the attack, did so because they would no longer abstain from the assault of a position, which had never been occupied but by an army without *cavalry* that could leave the road†—an army without a *gun* that could be drawn, except with the aid of men, up the slightest ascent‡—and with an *infantry*, which from want of ammunition was unable to engage in a protracted combat; whose *limbs* were already *half frozen*, and whom *famine* had reduced so as to excite the expressive indignation of a Cossack—"Is it not a shame to see these skeletons walking away from their graves?"

* There had been some partial actions of detached corps before the French troops filed into their position, but no general operation.

† It had indeed ceased to be cavalry—the horses could scarcely crawl.

‡ The road was full of ravines, the sides of which were slippery as glass; and in these ravines the French guns were abandoned.

At this memorable Krasnow, where, on the third day, Ney fought a combat which, from the fury of the attack, and the intrepidity of the defence, might be called "the combat of heroes"—from which field the same marshal withdrew his gallant remnant, traversing an unknown country, passing the Boristhenes, and rejoining Napoleon*, *notwithstanding the whole Russian army had been halted†, and posted to resist his column and intercept his retreat*—a judicious disposition, without relinquishing the pursuit of Napoleon's army, would have rendered the capture of the *whole* corps inevitable.

At the Berezina—where Napoleon, reinforced by Oudinot, found only a corps of *eighteen thousand* men under Tchichagow to guard a river line of *thirty* miles; until Wittgenstein arrived to contribute to the disasters which ensued, and join in an unremitting pursuit; where Tchichagow presented a force by *disobeying*

* Napoleon, hearing of the action before Ney appeared, said, "I would give the ten millions in my treasury for his safety."

† An halt, which enabled Napoleon to pass the Boristhenes and Berezina.

instructions to proceed on Ingumen, under the conviction that Napoleon was moving in that direction; where *not one* soldier of the grand Russian army arrived until *two days* after the passage had been effected; here again, as on former occasions, if proper use had been made of the advantages which superiority of the *total* force, positions, nature, the state of the enemy, and the *zeal and courage* of the Russian officers and soldiers offered, and which in many instances, fortunately for the honour of their arms, could not be restrained, not a *solitary* individual of the whole French army could have escaped.

The Russian army under Kutusow, which, in the commencement of the pursuit, had amounted to *one hundred and twenty thousand* effective men, could only array *thirty-five thousand** on the frontier of the Duchy of Warsaw, to which shattered force were opposed more than as many comparatively *fresh* troops under an Austrian general, in a friendly country, and where

* There were many companies without a *single man*, and many battalions with not so many as fifty.

every man was a soldier, exclusive of *several thousand* Poles, who had escaped from the ruin of the grand French army, and who alone, of all the corps of which that army was composed, conducted back their artillery—a memorial of their discipline as well as courage.

Wittgenstein's and Tchichagow's corps did not amount to *twenty-five thousand* men; but the opportune defection of General Yorke, with about *fourteen thousand* Prussians, left them opposed to only the remnant of the French army under Murat, and the garrisons of the Vistula, which had been largely reinforced by the fugitives from Russia—Dantzic alone containing *thirty-five thousand* men, until fever occasioned the subsequent mortality, which reduced them to little more than *ten thousand* at the period of the capitulation.

Murat could and wished to have assembled *forty thousand* men, when, combining his operations with the Austrians at Warsaw, Russia must have seen her armies, or rather the skeletons of her armies, retrograde to the Niemen. Such had been the destruction, even

amongst the Russians, that a reinforcement of *ten thousand* men, which had marched for Wilna, arrived only with *fifteen hundred*; and of them *seven hundred* were next day in the hospitals, or rather the charnel-houses of that city*.

* In the hospitals of Wilna there were left above *seventeen thousand* dead and dying, frozen and freezing. The bodies of the former, *broken up*, served to stop the cavities in windows, floors, and walls; but in one of the corridors of the Great Convent, above *fifteen hundred* bodies were piled up transversely, as pigs of lead or iron. When these were finally removed on sledges to be burnt, the most extraordinary figures were presented by the variety of their attitudes, for none seemed to have been frozen in a composed state: each was fixed in the last action of his life, in the last direction given to his limbs: even the eyes retained the last expression, either of anger, pain, or entreaty. In the roads, men were collected round the burning ruins of the cottages, which a mad spirit of destruction had fired, picking and eating the burnt bodies of fellow men; while thousands of horses were moaning in agony, with their flesh mangled and hacked to satisfy the cravings of a hunger that knew no pity. In many of the sheds, men, scarcely alive, had heaped on their frozen bodies human carcases, which, festering by the communication of animal heat, had mingled the dying and the dead in one mass of putrefaction.

The opinion of Murat was overruled, while the Austrian general, to the astonishment and disappointment of the inhabitants, by orders from Vienna to sign the proposed convention, abandoned the duchy and city of Warsaw.

The Vistula was passed, and the main Russian army, reduced by farther sickness and exertion, mustered only *eighteen thousand* men, when the campaign was closed by the occupation of Kalish.

The advantage of this campaign to Russia was proportionably great to the injury designed by her enemy. Her capital had been consumed, with immense wealth: many of her provinces had been laid waste with desolating fury; and above *two hundred thousand* of her regular soldiery had perished: but to have developed the resources of the empire, to have electrified the spirit of the people, were copious and lasting compensations for evils, which time and industry would repair.

Napoleon had been inaccurately informed on several points relative to Russia. His

three principal errors were, a belief—that there were no good roads but where the hardened snow covered the surface—that cultivation was neglected—and that her population was dispersed. He found, however, as fine and indeed broader roads than any in France, for the guns could move three abreast with considerable intervening space—the country fertilized, and redundant with food of all descriptions—and a population in the extensive provinces round Moscow condensed, so as at least to equal in amount the number of inhabitants in any part of Europe, on the same given space of ground! He also saw a peasantry better housed, better supplied with fuel, better clothed, and, according to their habits, better fed than any peasantry on the continent, or any of the peasantry of *modern* England! Still there is no doubt of the fact, that a *servile* war might have been fomented in Russia, if the discipline of Napoleon's heterogeneous army could have been maintained, so as to have avoided outrages and insults, which exasperated and shocked religious prejudices: nor is it less true, that, notwithstanding these alienating causes, Napoleon rejected offers of insur-

rection, which were made to him when in Moscow.

Alexander, during this crisis, had displayed a degree of firmness, which deranged all the calculations of Napoleon and his coadjutors. He pledged himself, *as a sovereign and a man*, that he would never treat with Napoleon *whilst there was an armed enemy in his country*; and his inflexible firmness rendered nugatory those attempts at negotiation, which are reported not to have received the same discouragement in other quarters.

His views even then embraced the future; and an anecdote industriously circulated at a subsequent period, relative to the transactions at Abo, affords a memorable and splendid proof of his prospective policy.

England and Russia had determined to adopt the same line of proceeding with regard to Denmark as had occasioned, according to the declaration of Alexander, the war between those two nations.—Such are the unfixed, and

it may be said revolutionary principles of cabinets!

Alexander insisted, that Sweden should be indemnified by Norway for Finland, in case Denmark refused to join the coalition.

The English minister, forgetting that Russia, by the possession of ALAND, SWEABORG, and the WHOLE GULPHS OF FINLAND AND BOTHNIA, was, in fact, mistress of STOCKHOLM, agreed to an annexation, which surrendered a country, so important for its *maritime** resources, ports, and position, to the same *influence* and *authority*. The treaty being signed, Alexander, who, as before said, never forgets the unintentional wrong which he did to his nephew, developed the true object of the arrangement, by saying to Bernadotte, "If Napoleon fails in his attack against my empire, and the French throne becomes vacant by the result of his defeat, I shall think no one so eligible as yourself for that station." Important words, which serve as a key to explain many of the future

* It is computed, that Norway furnished ten thousand sailors to England.

mysteries, and which have not yet lost their value; although Bernadotte does not enjoy equal consideration in the eyes of Russia, since he did not acquire the expected suffrages of the French people, and afford the desired opportunity for the re-establishment of the ancient dynasty.

Alexander, after joining the army at Wilna, had afforded useful encouragement to personal exertions by his own exemplary endurance of privations, cold, fatigue, &c.; an example, which, added to great affability, produced, not only very beneficial effects on the soldiery, but which sustained the enthusiasm of the Russian nation. In the head quarters at Kalish, he was equally remarkable for diligence. Couriers, with autograph letters in many instances, were dispatched in all directions to bring up the recovered wounded and sick, to advance the new recruits and medical stores, and to infuse the ardour of the sovereign into every department of the government.

The efforts obtained full success: voluntary contributions in men and money poured in

from the nobility; and the whole empire resounded with the huzzas of triumph, hymns of thanksgiving, and the Pashol, or march word, "for Poland, and Paris."

The Cossacks, enriched with the immense booty which their vigilance, activity, and valour, had acquired, streamed from the Don; and the oldest veterans, and youngest boys capable of wielding a lance, were seen daily amongst the reinforcements arriving to range themselves under the banner of their *justly* venerated Hetman.

The operations of the cabinet were no less vigorously conducted, and no less successfully accomplished.

The King of Prussia, who had disclaimed the conduct of general Yorke, and who had resolved on faithfully adhering to his treaties with Napoleon, at last signed the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Russia; but he acquiesced only an hour before the signature was affixed; and only then, under the suggestion, that in case of refusal, it was possible a

provisional government might be established in his kingdom*.

In the month of May, an army of about *eighty thousand* Russians, and *sixty thousand* Prussians, passed the Elbe, near Wittenberg and Dresden.

Napoleon, who had been no less active and energetic, presented himself at Lutzen; where, from an injudicious disposition of the cavalry, and the want of simultaneous efforts on the part of the allies, he gained a sanguinary victory, which would have ruined their armies, if he th could have brought any cavalry into the field to press the retreat.†

Reinforcements replaced the Russian losses; negotiations offered by Napoleon were reject-

* Napoleon, who knew this anecdote, and alluded to it in one of his bulletins, always spoke of the good faith of the King of Prussia with much respect.

† The Russian rear guard could not pass the Elbe for ten days; during which time it was embarrassed with the protection of *ten thousand* four wheeled carriages of every description, moving along the same road.

ed; and the battle of Bautzen was hazarded, contrary to all military science and political prudence.

The French, by an attack in flank of a salient position, overpowered the Prussians (who fought gallantly), and gained the ground; but the retreat, ending in the affair of Reichenbach, where Duroc was killed, added to the honour of the Russians and the confidence of the allies.

The armistice ensued; and, during the negotiations, above *sixty thousand* good troops from Odessa, and distant provinces, entered the Russian camps.

Austria was still unwilling to quit the position of arbitrator, and join the coalition, whilst the interests of Napoleon required peace to dissolve a confederacy, which every day enlarged and cemented. Pride or destiny prevailed. He would not write even a *conciliatory* note to his *father in law*, which would have sufficed to prolong the period prescribed for the diplomatic answer; and the Austrians marched!

A detail of the ensuing military events would exceed the limits proposed to this summary sketch: but the great incidents and varieties of fortune present themselves with too powerful an impression, and must have engaged too much public curiosity to be passed over without some notice.

An attempt made by Marshal Ney with *seventy thousand* men, to take Berlin, covered by the Swedish and Prussian armies, had been defeated with great loss; while the French troops in Silesia, ordered to retrograde on Dresden, had been pressed by the allied forces in that direction, and sustained farther considerable injury by the overflow of a river.

The subsequent operations against Dresden, in which above *two hundred thousand* of the allied troops were employed, had been baffled by the activity and judicious audacity of Napoleon with *eighty thousand* men.

The confederates, driven into the defiles of the mountains of Bohemia and Saxony, lost at least *forty thousand* men in the campaign of

those few days, and would have been annihilated, as the Russian army might have been after the battle of Smolensk, without the *power of formation or resistance even by battalions*, if Vandamme could have gained the mouth of the defile from which he was at one time distant scarcely a league! but which the heroic devotion of Ostreman, with *five thousand Russians*, covered. Vandamme's perseverance in a false position in the plain below the mountain, after his original attempt had proved abortive, occasioned his ruin *; whilst the allied army not only obtained preservation and victory, but

* Even here the vicissitudes of fortune were remarkable. The Prussians having possessed themselves of the heights, instead of taking post, descended in column of march, with a great train of artillery. When the allies had broken in on Vandamme's position by various attacks on front and flank, the French cavalry desperately resolved to cut their way through the Prussians up the mountain, which was so steep, that few horses could, under other circumstances, be pressed up in *the gentlest trot*; but they ascended with so much force and power as to overthrow completely all the Prussian column, and acquire possession of every gun belonging to it. Of course these remained to the allies finally; but the greatest part of the horses were taken away, and many of the artillery men were massacred. "Victoresque cadunt Danai."

confidence, which obliterated the recollection of former disasters, and in truth repaired them, by permitting the immediate resumption of the offensive.

On the other hand, Napoleon had lost his opportunity to profit by the retreat of the grand allied army, in consequence of an error in the order sent Ney, who, instead of repairing solely in his own person to Dresden, brought back his corps several days' march.

The subsequent battles, comprised under the name of the battle of Leipzig, were the most memorable in the history of the war, from the number of the troops engaged, the efforts made by the whole, and the magnitude of the prize in contest.

On the 12th the Russians had received a severe check from the French cavalry, gallantly headed by Murat, who repeatedly charged sword in hand—the first in the advance, and the last in the return.

The combined operations, however, did not begin until the 16th.

On that day the allies were completely repulsed, with the loss of above *thirty thousand* men, and obliged to defer for one day the renewal of the battle, that they might receive a reinforcement of *fifty thousand* men from the neighbourhood of Dresden.

Napoleon, in the interval, by the capture of General Merveldt, had become acquainted with the long negotiated defection of Bavaria, the union of an Austrian corps with a Bavarian army, and their intended descent upon his line of communication near Hanau.

He instantly ordered a retreat, and sent back General Merveldt, with offers of peace, which General Merveldt brought (as the allied troops were marching to attack on the morning of the 18th), *with the farther information, that the retrograde movement was already in execution, and that the French army had withdrawn from the ground of former contest to concentrate and cover Leipzig, whilst the reserve artillery and stores were filing on the Saal and Erfurt. The intelligence was confirmed by successive reports from various commanders, and the check*

of a body of Austrians posted on that line of communication. The result, therefore, of the proposed movements, and the object of the campaign, was thus *already secured*: but the allies sought to profit by the necessity of the enemy; and the enemy had no other alternative than to fight, not for the usual rewards of victory, but self-preservation.

One hundred and eighty thousand men, with more than one thousand pieces of cannon, assailed the position defended by one hundred and twenty thousand adversaries: but notwithstanding the defection of the Saxon army during the battle, and the most ardent and persevering courage of the allied troops, not a village could be wrested from the enemy, which he had proposed to maintain as an essential point of his position.

The fall of night closed the action, leaving the defenders of PROBSTHEYDE the glory of having inspired their enemies with a generous envy.

But whilst the presence of Napoleon had obtained so much honour and safety for the main French army, the united Swedish and Prussian

armies, who had defeated *three* corps under Marmont at Radefeld on the 14th, had obtained farther success, and opened a direct communication with the grand allied army ; so that the position of Leipzig momentarily became more critical.

The allies, who in the several actions had altogether lost not less than *sixty thousand* men, did not propose to renew the combat on the *ensuing* morning, but to make a movement across the Elster, so as to intercept the retreat of those corps which might remain in positions on the right bank, whilst another corps pursued the columns which had passed, and thus assisted the operation of the Bavarians.

It was found, however, that the French troops had been retreating the whole night, and that the rear guard was withdrawn into Leipzig—a place capable of resisting a *coup de main*.

Napoleon, with his thoughts constantly fixed on the BAVARIAN movement, whose fatal operative power he knew well how to appreciate,

had urged the unremitting retreat of his troops, superintending himself its execution, until nearly twelve o'clock in the day, when he left the city, and only a few minutes before the Cossacks had rounded the walls, and appeared on the plain between them and the river Pleisse.

Napoleon had directed *three* bridges to be thrown over this river, which was narrow but deep, with banks difficult to ascend; but this instruction had not been obeyed, and the troops were obliged to file across *one*—the *only* one existing; which caused great delay and confusion, as the press increased by the approaching fire.

Some Cossacks had first approached the suburbs, which had also been fortified: then some light infantry crawled on without positive instructions: others followed, as there was scarcely any resistance; and at last columns advanced with cannon to force an entrance.

When Napoleon quitted the town, the King of Saxony, who had been left, at his own request, sent to the allied sovereigns an offer to

deliver up the city; such of his troops as had not deserted, and those of Weimar and Baden, remaining in the square with reversed arms, to await the entrance of the allies.

In the city the French had abandoned all their wounded and sick; but the whole army had safely passed the Elster, except the rear guard of about *eight thousand* men, when the before mentioned party of Cossacks, having swept round the town, appeared in the plain on the other side: the officer, charged with the destruction of the bridge to prevent pursuit after the passage of the French army, alarmed, and panic struck, fired the combustibles, and thus those, who had not gained the left bank of the stream were cut off from communication with their columns—Part perished in an attempt to swim across; and amongst these the generous, brave and patriotic Poniatowski. Others were shot, but the greater portion were made prisoners.

The allied sovereigns soon afterwards entered the grand square of Leipzig. The King of Saxony, being constituted a prisoner in a

house, at the windows of which he had for a moment appeared to witness the triumphant entry and assemblage of his royal brothers, and experience the mortification of indifference to his presence.

The Crown Prince of Sweden and Alexander here, for the first time, met, since the conferences at Abo.

Alexander still felt the same political dispositions in his favour; but many circumstances had occurred to diminish his popularity with the coalition.

A treaty, which gave Sweden *twelve hundred thousand pounds* per annum of British money, and the assurance of Norway, was a great temptation for the government of that country to abandon her connexion with France; but, on the other hand, it established a right to great exertion and liberal services. It was thought the Crown Prince had, since the operations commenced, *economised* his troops too much; and, when he justified his cautious employment of Swedes by the observation "if he lost his ar-

my, which could not be recruited, he lost his throne," that he reasoned as Bernadotte, and not as the leader of a subsidized force.

The fact is, that Bernadotte had placed himself in a false position, when fighting to destroy those troops, by whose services he had acquired his honours and fortune ; and that every dead, wounded, or captive Frenchman, on whom he cast his eyes, was an image of reproach, to which he could not avoid being sensible.

The sovereigns, probably with pleasure, saw him remove to act against the north of Germany ; and his departure might have been accelerated by the impression, that monarchs in prosperity do not view with an eye of favour, in the royal circle, *elected* heirs to hereditary thrones.

Napoleon, with great rapidity, proceeded to gain the Rhine, that he might anticipate the lodgment of the Bavarian general Wrede on the route, of whose movements he received continued advice. Wrede, however, had reached Hanau with about *thirty thousand* men, including Frimont's corps.

False information, as to the state of the French retreating army, and the belief that it was closely pressed by the grand allied army*, added to ardent feelings, induced a rash advance, which ended in a retrograde movement for concentration in a too condensed and not sufficiently examined position.

Napoleon knew the value of time, and the power of daring enterprize. His cavalry and artillery executed his orders with the requisite promptitude and courage. The confederate army was routed, *fifteen thousand* were killed or wounded; and, with some analogy to the battle of Culm, the fugitives marched in the step of victory.

* Every exertion had been made by Schwartzenberg, but it was not possible to pursue with more rapidity, from the want of provisions. Schwartzenberg, the commander in chief, directed himself all the movements, and there is no officer in Europe better qualified for the conduct of a great army. To great activity and courage he joins superior knowledge of those duties of a leader, which assure order in combinations, and accuracy in dispositions. To this capacity he added a mildness and patience of temper, which made him greatly beloved in the army, and which preserved union amongst the allies. Without him there might have been, more than once, serious dissensions.

Napoleon, however, could not resume the offensive. He was obliged, after leaving a rear guard at Hockheim, from which it was soon afterwards driven, to throw his troops into the fortresses of France; where, from youth and overstrained exertion, fevers were introduced, and multitudes perished.

Napoleon, when ignorant of the Bavarian defection and operation, had proposed to maintain his positions on the Elbe, and had left St. Cyr in Dresden with nearly *thirty thousand men* to fall on the flank and rear of the confederate army advancing to Leipzig. On quitting Leipzig, Napoleon entertained the hope, that St. Cyr would gain early intelligence of his retreat, evacuate Dresden, and, by passing down the right bank of the Elbe, and uniting the garrisons of Torgau, Wittenberg, &c.*, with the troops under Davoust, would have formed an army of nearly *one hundred thousand men*, partly

* Perhaps releasing the garrisons on the Oder, which might have been done, and from which he would have withdrawn about twelve thousand men, even Berlin was open to a *coup de main*.

covered by Magdeburgh, sustained by Denmark, and generally masters of positions, which would have been not only impregnable, but must have so completely awed Prussia and Saxony as to have paralyzed all the projected operations of the allies, and afforded him time for the renovation of his army.

The opportunity was presented, but, perhaps from inaccurate or too tardy information, lost; and, at last, St. Cyr, considering the composition of his garrison, in which there was an extraordinary number of officers, conceived, that he should best advance the interests of his sovereign and country by agreeing to a capitulation, on the condition "of a free passage to France for the whole."

The motives, which influenced General St. Cyr, were, however, exactly those, which rendered the terms inadmissible for the interests of the allied sovereigns, although the general in command of the blockading army, Kleinau, had agreed to them, and the evacuation of the city had commenced on the faith of his alleged full powers and signature. St. Cyr was offered to be replaced

with his garrison in Dresden; but it was as impossible to restore him to all the advantages of his former position, as it would be to indemnify a person accused, by a new trial, after the nature of his defence had been exposed.

St. Cyr, therefore, having protested "against this violation of faith and military honour," was marched with his garrison as prisoners of war into Austria; whilst Kleinau was sent to be tried by the council of war at Vienna, by whom he was *most honourably acquitted*.

Nearly a similar proceeding occurred at Dantzic about the same time, where, after a siege creditable to the respective forces, a capitulation between General Rapp* and the Duke of Wurtemberg—officers who would rather have hewn off their own hands than affixed a signature to deceive, and who could not suspect the measure adopted—was annulled.

* General Rapp has, on all occasions, acquired great distinction; and he is one of those commanders, who always knew how to conciliate public esteem with the discharge of his military duty.

Alexander, although not the nominal *commander in chief* of the allies, exercised great influence, and received the principal homage of the Germans; to which the popularity of his manners very materially contributed.

During the march, he was constantly at the head of his troops, and forgot no occasion for their instruction. But his attention was not limited to military discipline. Objects beneficial to Russia were his constant research. Every artist, every manufacturer, every mechanic, who presented himself, with powers of utility, was immediately engaged; and persons were constantly employed to discover *men* and *things* worthy his notice.

Negotiations were proposed at Frankfort.—The interference of England, assisted with some advices from Paris as to the state of that capital, rendered them cold on the part of the allies; and, perhaps, they were never sincere on that of Napoleon.

The invasion of France was proposed.

Austria agreed, if Murat joined the coalition, and thus removed uneasiness for Vienna from the side of Italy. Alexander assented, if Switzerland *sanctioned* the operation, by granting the passage of the Rhine through her territory.

Confidential officers were sent to reconnoitre, and according to their report the suitable preparations were made.

Some thousand infantry having passed in silence, and the dead of night, were received with open arms; notwithstanding the Diet had, only a few days before, determined to defend the neutrality of their country against all parties.

Compulsive alliances must always be subject to the vicissitudes of war. The cold support of Austria when Napoleon was entangled in the difficulties of his Russian campaign, the defection of General Yorke, the desertion of the Saxons, even the conduct of Bavaria, were all probable events from adequate causes, or not without precedent in history; but that a free people (the descendants of William Tell,) *enjoying*

their independent neutrality, *allowed* to preserve it, and in a *position to maintain it*, should abandon, yield, or negotiate away a right so important for their country, and so solemnly declared to be inviolable, was only to be conceived by those who hold, that public virtue is but an Utopian theory*.

France, confiding in the ramparts of Swiss neutrality, had always neglected to fortify the opposing frontier : she was, therefore, quite uncovered on that side.

Austria, having received assurances of Murat's co-operation, and further encouragement from the capital of France, pushed forwards towards Paris ; whilst the Prussians, &c., forced

* Switzerland has introduced the torture into some of her cantons, and appears to be in the aristocratic government exactly what Gibbon described in his day, when using the language of the ambassador of Porsenna :—

Qu'il vant mieux qu'un roi sur le trône affirmé
Commande à ses sujets malheureux, mais, soumis
Que d'avoir à dompter au sien de l'abondance
D'un peuple trop heureux l'indocile arrogance.

the passage of the Rhine, near Mannheim, and advanced on Nancy.

The transactions of those days are familiar to the public recollection; and the more they are examined, after all party feeling has subsided, when no prejudices, or no partialities mislead the judgment or control the inquiry, the more will they add to the reputation of Napoleon as a Great Captain.

With *sixty thousand* brave and indefatigable men, he baffled the operations of *two hundred thousand* for more than six weeks; obtained victories, which obliged Alexander to seek the Austrian commander in his bed, at four o'clock in the morning, "to desire he would instantly expedite a courier to Chatillon with orders for the signature of the treaty of peace, as *agreed to* by the French negotiator," until he heard, unfortunately for his master, Napoleon, of those very successes, which made the *Emperor of Austria*, with *one nobleman*, and *one servant*, fly, in a German *droska*, for safety to Dijon, and remain there *thirty* hours virtually a *prisoner*, and strictly one, if any Frenchman had done his

duchy*—victories, which threw the allied army, then only *one hundred and twenty thousand* strong, with the sovereigns, between the *city of Paris* and his cannon; without *any line of communication with the Rhine*, or *any intermediate magazines, &c.*, without *any ammunition*, and without *any stores*, except such as were *in movement with the army itself*—victories, which screwed them, as it were, in a *vice*, from which, if defection had not extricated them, they were unable to secure their escape, and yet obliged to make the attempt.

The measures, which it was believed had been long in preparation, were consummated at the very instant Napoleon's success seemed beyond the *power* of misfortune! and the movement on *St. Dizier*, which merited *empire*, lost him his *crown*.

Ten thousand men of the allies had been killed or wounded in the attack on Montmartre, chiefly from the artillery served by the boys of the polytechnic school. The acquisition of

* Metternich joined him with some flying secretaries next day.

this post assured only the destruction of buildings, if the experiment of bombardment had been made. The army was too weak and too ill provided, to attempt a forcible occupation of the city*, which must have expended so many men and so much *ammunition*, as to have rendered the possession untenable, when Napoleon approached with his army to its relief; and the sallying force too weak to hazard battle in the open field.

Such was the conviction on the minds of those charged with the conduct of the allied army, that a retreat *was already resolved on*, in case the promised co-operation in the city had not been accomplished.

The *departure* of the Empress, in consequence of peremptory orders from Napoleon, shown

* There were no less than *fifty thousand* regular soldiers and national guards, exclusive of numbers of dispersed soldiers, and inhabitants who had served, who would all have assisted the defence. The national guards would, indeed, have fought with Marmont's corps; in which case Montmartre would not have been lost: but their zeal was controlled; and Paris became the grave of French honour.

her by Joseph Buonaparte, was fatal to his dynasty.

Talleyrand, on being asked to name the *government* and *governor* most agreeable to the French *senate* and *people*, answered, "A constitutional monarchy, and Louis."

Alexander had for some time been obliged to relinquish the proposed arrangements in favour of Bernadotte, who had loitered at Liege, and who, in fact, had done too much for his *character* in France, and too little for his *interests* with the allies*.

* Nevertheless, England was true to her engagement, nay, to the *constructive* spirit of it; for she employed her fleet, the fleet of a free people, in blockading the Norwegian ports, to compel a reluctant nation, by *famine*, to receive the yoke; although that nation only required neutrality from England, that she might negotiate or fight for her independence. The Swedish government seems to have acted towards the Norwegians, when obliged to capitulate, with great liberality and good sense: but this conduct does not affect the question of the right of England to make over a nation to another power, because its own government refused to break its neutrality; nor does it mitigate the reproach of England, for employing her arms in such a service.

Alexander, personally, as it was believed, ill-disposed to the Bourbon family, reluctantly acquiesced in the proposition. The King of Prussia did not object; but Schwartzberg, for a few instants was silent, and Talleyrand was uneasy if not alarmed. Schwartzberg, however, probably unwilling to charge himself with the responsibility of a refusal (his sovereign and Metternich being absent), did not finally withhold his assent: and thus, by two *foreign* sovereigns, a *foreign* marshal, and an *ar-*minister, was Louis *chosen*—King of France!—*legitimate pretensions*, and the subsequently alleged *right* and *title* to the throne, not in the remotest degree influencing that choice.

The defection of Marmont, accompanied with the contingent events, terminated the war; and Napoleon, still an emperor, proceeded to his asylum, overthrown but not overcome.

Alexander, who had been ambitious at Chatillon to stipulate for the entrance of some battalions of his guards into Paris, that he might in some degree balance parades at the Thuille-

ries against those of the Kremlin, and whose anxiety on this point had been one of the real obstacles to the conclusion of peace, now saw himself in possession of the *French capital*, the creator of its new monarchy, and the arbiter of its destinies!

Gratified in his vanities, but not intoxicated by his successes, he sought after and acquired by his policy and mildness, the affections of all parties. To the *Royalists* he was the guardian of the *royal dynasty*—to the *Napoleonists* he was the preserver of the integrity of France, and to the *Constitutionalists* he was the *champion* of a *liberal government*. But in this moment of triumph he never forgot Russia, and added largely to former importations for the advancement of the arts, science, and industry in that country*.

The *negotiations* of Paris regulated the points

* The enemies of Alexander seek to involve him in the mysterious transactions of Maubreuil, which occurred at this time. Pozzo di Borgo ought to insist on having a copy of the depositions, and on the proceedings being made public. Calumny and malevolence are busy, and ought to be exposed.

at issue with France, and left the fate of Naples, Saxony, and Poland to be settled at Congress; whilst the allotment of Belgium, and the destiny of the kingdom of Italy, were definitively arranged, although not officially promulgated.

The Emperor of Austria had always declared, that he would never reoccupy the Milanese states, in any event of the war; but Alexander, resolved on the acquisition of the Duchy of Warsaw, insisted on Austria's taking to herself those provinces, as compensating aggrandizements; thus the *kingdom* of Italy, whose independence had so often been guaranteed by these very powers, in their treaties with Napoleon, and whose moral regeneration had been commensurate with its political growth, was again reduced to a *provincial* dependence*.

* Alexander had at that time determined to make himself King of Poland, and recommended the Emperor of Austria to preserve the Italian *monarchy*, and wear the iron crown; but the Emperor refused, as he was afraid to keep alive the recollections of independence. But the debarkation of Napoleon in 1815, forced acquiescence in a measure, which the Italians had much at heart.

It may be said, that the kingdom of Italy was a fief to Napoleon—it was so, but not to France. The two crowns, after his decease, were never to be placed on the same head.

Who does not mourn over the fortunes of this country, so favoured by nature—so desolated by man? Who sees the wreck of her institutions and national establishments, without giving honour to their founder, and without lamenting her dismemberment?

Napoleon took away some statues and pictures, the greater part of which were obscured (if it were possible in that fine climate to obscure any thing), in gloomy abodes of superstition; but these, at all events, were the *superfluous ornaments* of a country, for which he substituted wise laws, national feelings, state views, high military character, stupendous and useful works, industrious habits, as well as a munificent encouragement of the arts and sciences.

Whatever may be said of his government in France, of his usurpations in Europe, and of ma-

any other transactions in his life*, he must and always will be remembered by Italy with affection.

Had he, as he might have done (notwithstanding France was unwilling), but formed *one great independent Italy*†, or a *federative system of states*, his work would have been immortal,

* The proposition to administer opium to men infected with plague, he has defended on a plea of humanity—death being inevitable, and previous outrage from the Turks no less certain. The execution of the garrison of Jaffa he justifies by the laws of war—and says, that those he doomed to suffer had violated their engagement at El Arish, not to bear arms again, until exchanged. The death of the Duke d'Enghien he laments, but asserts that he was directing the conspiracy of Pichegru and Georges; and that the letter which this unfortunate prince wrote was not delivered until several days after the tragical event, or he would have spared his life.

Motives, no doubt, may determine the character of such acts—our Fifth Henry preserves his reputation unsullied. These transactions, however, have nothing to do with the merits or demerits of his general political administration, nor can they be cited to justify wrong on the part of those who professed to correct wrong. “*Perfidia perfidiam ultus, contra Romanam dignitatem, Barbaros imitabatur.*”

† By establishing the seat of government at Rome, and placing the Pope at Venice; or by uniting the spiritual and

and his fame imperishable in the gratitude of mankind.

The Italian army had in no way contributed to the disasters of their country.

Successive advantages had enabled them to advance beyond Villack, on the Drave, distant about *one hundred and fifty* miles from Vienna; which capital was covered by a force so insignificant, that even, on the 27th of August, the main body could only muster *nine* battalions and *eight* squadrons for the protection of all Lower Austria!

The disasters of Napoleon having uncovered Switzerland, and the defection of Bavaria having opened the passage of the Tyrol, a retreat on the Adige became necessary.

The intervening conflicts had been numerous

temporal authority, making priests *citizens*, and allowing them to marry, with some other suitable regulations, which Napoleon might have accomplished with as much ease as he removed the Pope from the Vatican, on which service a corporal's guard was the whole force employed.

and bloody, but the movements had never been precipitated into disorder by any defeat.

On the Adige, Prince Eugene refused the offers of the allies, and replied, "the more Napoleon is unfortunate, the more devoted shall be my zeal in his service."

The movements of Murat, who felt himself in a different situation from the Viceroy, and whose throne had been menaced by Napoleon, obliged Eugene to fall back on the Mincio, where he occupied the strongest military line of frontier in Europe—a line running along the river Mincio, which, taking its source from the lake Di-Guarda, falls into the Po, after a course of *twenty-eight* English miles, at Governolo; but the country between Mantua and that point being impracticable for the movements of troops, on account of its deep land, the line is in fact reduced to the distance between Mantua and Peschiera, a space of only *sixteen* miles, with the farther advantage, for the power of manœuvre, of its left being distant from Verona only *ten* miles, and its right *seventeen*.

The fortresses of Mantua, and the fortified *tetes du ponts* of Peschiera, Monzambano, Goito, and Governolo, afforded secure passage at *five* points ; whilst the heights of Volta, nearly in the *centre*, added a base for defence, and enabled movements to be made without observation.

The rear of the right flank was covered by the Po, on which a fortified *tete du pont* had been established ; and Placentia had been converted into a strong *place d'armes*.

The Italian army, and the French corps under Grenier, amounted to about *forty-five thousand* men, applicable to operations on the Mincio ; but the real disposable force, without the aid of the garrisons on that line, did not exceed *thirty-six thousand*.

On the other hand, the Austrian army, weakened by being obliged to mask Venice, Legnago, and other fortresses to the rear, and to post corps of observation against Mantua, Peschiera, &c., as well as in the mountains of the lake

Di-Guarda*, was still farther enfeebled by *thirty-five thousand* sick, so that it could not bring into the field more than *thirty-six thousand* men, unless Murat effectually co-operated; and this, Murat felt it would be imprudent to do, until he had received the long promised *autograph letter of the Emperor of Austria, guaranteeing his treaty, when the regular official instrument could be prepared.*

Bellegarde, urged by repeated representations from sovereigns, ministers, and generals, to advance, and gain possession of the Alps, where there was a reserve of *eight thousand* French, in Turin, Fenestrelles, &c., exclusive of the garrison of Genoa, and a force at Alexandria†, made his dispositions for the passage of the Mincio at Valleggio.

It had been presumed, that the Italian army, leaving garrisons in Mantua and Peschiera, would retreat; but although the passage of the

* The Austrian-Italian army had also to supply the troops acting in Dalmatia.

† The troops retreating from the Roman and Tuscan states assembled at these points.

river was not seriously defended, it was soon perceived, that the resistance at the village of Mon San Bano was more determined than that of a *rear guard*; and some anxiety was therefore directed towards Mantua.

All the troops destined to pass at Valleggio had crossed, except a brigade; and the grenadiers, who had been ordered to observe Mantua, were about to effect their passage also, at a point where the bridge had been already constructed, when the enemy, sallying from Mantua with *eighteen thousand* men, attacked with great fury the Austrian troops stationed on all the points of observation, and drove them back several miles.

The guns had no sooner been heard at Valleggio, than the battalions awaiting passage were sent to reinforce those attacked; but they did not arrive to their support until the enemy's columns had advanced within a mile and a half of Valleggio, and the *bridge*, on which the safety of the whole army depended; nor could troops be withdrawn from the right bank until near four o'clock in the evening, when

the enemy, in their turn, began to retire, and were finally repulsed.

If Eugene, who had ably concealed his design, had but delayed his operation one more hour, he would have been inevitably in possession of the line of the Mincio, and the Austrian army would have been thrown, without any ammunition, except such as was already with the troops across the river, and without any base or communication, into a hostile country, encircled by rivers, fortresses, and Alps, and exposed to the attacks of a greatly superior force.

If, indeed, the Austrian troops, and especially the grenadiers, had not shown the most devoted zeal and courage, the operation of Eugene would have succeeded; for no troops ever fought with more ardour than the *united Italians and French* did on that occasion.

The Austrians, maimed by a loss of *five thousand* men, and a daily encreasing sick list, were obliged to remain on the defensive*,

* There was an affair on the Mincio the succeeding day,

until Murat and Lord William Bentinck (just landed in Tuscany) had settled their misunderstandings, and the *autograph* letter had been at last delivered, when a new plan of offensive operations was concerted.

General Nugent, with a detached corps, had previously received a severe check at Parma. The support of the Neapolitans had however obliged the enemy to fall back again on the Po, with loss.

Lord William Bentinck, having conducted his operations against Genoa with skill and gallantry, favoured by the friendly service of the inhabitants, in a *country where their hostility would have been ruinous*, occupied that city, and, remembering what Xenophon says, "that it is a great and excellent thing for every man, but especially generals, to be just, and to be so accounted in their faith and promises," he proclaimed the independence of this republic, which lived a day but to feel the pain of death more bitterly.

but it was one of no importance on the campaign, although many lives were lost.

The account being received of the capture of Paris, and the abdication of Napoleon, Bellegarde suspended his movement, and sent to demand the submission of the Viceroy.

Eugene, finding farther opposition vain, agreed to a convention, which allowed the Austrians to pass to the Alps, but did not permit them to enter any fortress, or the *capital of the kingdom*.

An insurrection, however, having broken out in Milan, which was attended with the massacre of the *French minister of finance*, and assurances being given, that the Austrian commander would take no political measure, until the allied sovereigns at Paris had decided the fate of Italy, Eugene agreed to an *additional article*, which surrendered the whole country into the hands of the Austrians, as trustees for the allies—an act of deviation from Eugene's original policy, which perhaps he has since repented; for it certainly facilitated the partition of the kingdom.

Eugene had at one moment resolved to throw himself, with the archives, the officers of state, and *twenty-five thousand* men (which force still remained disposable after the recall of the French troops by the *provisional government* of France) into Mantua. In this position, which would have required the establishment of *fifty thousand* Austrians in a marshy, unhealthy country, whilst the Italian flag still flying at Venice, &c., would have added to the embarrassment of the allies, Eugene conceived, that he might negotiate with success; or add dignity to his fall; but reflecting, that Napoleon had abdicated the crown of *Italy* as well as that of *France*, and that the sovereigns of Europe were assembled with power to regulate Europe according to the professed principles, which had engaged the popular feeling of all countries in a common cause, he was fearful to compromise the interests of the nation he governed in trust, by a measure indicative of suspicion, and therefore calculated to exasperate the allies; while malevolence would have charged him with motives of personal ambition.

The purest integrity, and a high sense of honour, seem to have characterized all the transactions of this brave man's life. He was placed in difficult situations, but he never sought to preserve popularity at the expense of his benefactor. His fidelity was *proved* to be incorruptible, and his courage on all occasions has been so exemplary, that envy herself has never disputed his title to the honours of the Chevalier, "*sans peur et sans reproche.*"

Alexander, having completed his objects, passed over to England, that he might see a country so worthy to engage all his attention. It is said, that some untoward circumstances, some inconsiderate expressions repeated and probably exaggerated, some usages of society, did not conciliate his good will. That a proceeding at Guildhall, where he was obliged to stand up in homage to "Rule Britannia," and which certainly was not very good taste in the presence of a sovereign guest, who had *eighty* sail of the line, and great maritime ambition, had occasioned some disgust; but it is most certain, that he left England with feelings of acknowledgment for the hospitality of his re-

ception—with admiration of the beauty, the accomplishments, and manners of her women—with veneration for some of her principal men—with great respect for her people—and in wonder at her institutions, and those generally diffused comforts, which *were* the great characteristics of this country ; but which, alas ! are now hourly disappearing.

Alexander, on his return to the Continent, redoubled his exertions for the re-equipment and encrease of his army ; exertions which, in the succeeding year, arrayed *three hundred thousand* men in column of march, with *two thousand* pieces of cannon, their tumbrils, &c., *all new* from his arsenals.

His senate had decreed him the title of "*the Blessed*," and would have paid him probably divine honours, if he had shown any disposition to receive them ; but his education and observation had taught him that these titular distinctions could add no consequence to *real* power : even the English garter had been accepted only under a sense of due courtesy, and on the condition of one of his own orders being received in exchange.

There had been some discontent at his long absence from Russia: but this was soothed; and he appeared at the Congress of Vienna rather as the Autocrat of Europe than co-sovereign of its independent states.

The discussions respecting Saxony were animated and intricate. Prussia required the *whole*: Russia was willing to assist that pretension, as it enabled her to obtain farther aggrandizements. England at first was of the same vote; but not for the same object. She hoped the alliance between Russia and Prussia was one only of sovereigns, therefore dissoluble; and she proposed to make Prussia the *tete du pont*, or advanced work of her continental policy.

A discussion in the British parliament, where the rights of an independent kingdom were powerfully advocated, caused a change of instruction to the British minister*; and, notwithstanding the reproach of Prussia, England

* Whitbread! Horner! Names inscribed on that sacred tablet, which even another Sylla would reverence, and spare the living for the sake of the dead!

joined with France and Austria to preserve the monarchy of Saxony, but did not oppose a partial dismemberment of this unfortunate country, which has always been the victim of the strongest power. An arrangement was consequently made, which dissatisfied all parties, and which, by consent of most parties, cannot endure.

Poland engaged the most serious negotiations. England is reproached, amongst various projects, for having proposed a more equal partition, that the very *hope* of reunion as a monarchy might be extinguished ! Alexander, urged by the Poles themselves as well as by his general views, inflexibly demanded the crown, and promised a *constitutional government* !

Naples urged the ratification of her treaties under Joachim—France and Sicily resisted—Russia was willing to sacrifice Murat, for the acquiescence of France with her Polish arrangements—Prussia was friendly to the person of Murat, from recollections at Tilsit, but under circumstances was obliged to remain

neuter—Austria, forgetting the obligations of her engagements, and of services received, wavered, in the hopes of ultimately acquiring Naples for herself; one of the principal and indeed essential objects of her policy for the preservation of her Italian dominions—England, from hatred of all the branches of Napoleon's family, and in opposition to her real interests, established a *secret tribunal* for the trial and condemnation of a sovereign, who had reposed implicit confidence in her good faith; and whose vacillations, which now formed the matter of the charges against him, had originated, not with himself but in the equivocal character of proceedings, which manifested and created suspicion.

The whole story is, however, so well and accurately told, in the history of that monarch's fall, by Count Macironi, that any abridgement would weaken the interest; but it is impossible for any mind, not depraved by political animosity, to read the narrative without the conviction being impressed, that Murat's treatment, by all parties, had been most unjustifiable; and, that the catastrophe, which

consummated his misfortunes, was an act of—
coward cruelty.

The attempts to violate the treaty between Commodore Campbell and the Queen of Naples have not yet been exposed to the world; but, although that brave and loyal officer is not alive to vindicate his honour and that of his country, the documents are in existence, and will one day assure justice to his memory.

Whilst the congress was reconstructing Europe—not according to *rights, natural affiances, language, habits, or laws*; but by *tables of finance*, which divided and subdivided her population into *souls, demi-souls**, and even *fractions*, according to a scale of the direct duties or taxes, which could be levied by the acquiring state—the festivities of victory were not suspended; but, if Alexander whirled, after the fashion of his country, in the circling dance, *his* head never lost its equipoise, *his* revelry never encroached on *his* hours of business, nor did *his* amusements divert *his* mind from more grave occupations.

* The words on the protocol are *ames, demi-ames, &c.*

Napoleon was, however, destined to surprise more than *one* merry making, in peace and in war !

The news of his debarkation terminated all intrigues, and all points in dispute.

The infraction of an *extorted* treaty, which the allies themselves had vitiated by breaking many of its stipulations, and menacing the violation of its *principal* conditions (although that intention is now denied), was declared in the instant of panic to be a delinquency, which superseded all divine and human laws ; ejecting the malefactor out of the pale of social protection, and subjecting him to the pains and penalties of the Roman proscription.

What sovereign is there, who may not have been accused by another sovereign as an unjustifiable disturber of the public peace ? What sovereign has not rendered himself amenable to the action of this outlawry, if Napoleon be criminal in the eye of the law of nations ?

To *proclaim impunity* for the destruction of any man is to *urge* the use of the dagger; *much less* indeed, the "mere winking of authority," is sufficient to instigate the crime.

"It is the curse of kings to be attended
By slaves that take their humour for a warrant,
And break into the bloody house of life."

Alexander hastened his armies forward. They arrived too late to engage in the military operations of a few days' campaign; but *one hundred and twenty thousand* men, subsequently reviewed at the camp of Virtù, astonished the assembled staff of the other armies of Europe by an uniformity of excellence, *never before* witnessed in such a large body of troops. Each battalion seemed a *chosen* one, and yet there was no preference. All were *pares et similes*.

Napoleon, after a triumphant march, had arrived at Paris. The most expressive account, and *true* history of that enterprise, is to be found in General Cambronne's replies, when put on his trial, on the 26th of April, 1816.

"These are the orders which were given me

by the Emperor: ‘Cambronne*! I give you the command of my advanced guard, in my finest campaign! You will not fire a single musket! Everywhere you will only find friends! Remember, that I go to resume my crown *without shedding a single drop of blood!*’ ”

On being asked for his farther orders, the General proceeded: “ All my orders were reduced to this; Go, sleep there—breakfast there—dine there—and there’s all†!”

Louis was driven from the throne, which, in truth, without the return of Napoleon had been drawn from under him by *himself* ‡;—for the *charter*, through which he had held it, had been broken in *every* article by outrages alarming the interests of many and the feelings of all.

* Cambronne! Je vous confie l’avant garde de ma plus belle campagne. Vous ne tenez pas un seul coup de fusil. Partant vous ne trouverez que des amis. Songez que je veux reprendre ma couronne sans repandre une seule goutte de sang.

† Allez, couchez là—dejeunèz là—dinez là—et voilà tout.

‡ If Napoleon had not returned, there would have been a revolution! The fact is indisputable.

As a place of refuge, England was the first object; but a courier from thence directed his course through Lisle; and at length he found shelter for *himself* and the *crown jewels* in Ghent, until the Duke d'Angoulême engaged by *capitulation* to procure the surrender of that state property.

Napoleon wished to advance into the Netherlands without delay; but, persuaded to remain in Paris and negotiate, he lost the occasion to profit by the diversion of Murat, and the inadequate force of the allies then in the Low Countries.

Betrayed to his enemies from the hour of his arrival by clandestine communications—opposed in all his measures for electrifying public spirit, and organizing the defence of the country; he also alienated from his interests, by the *acte additionel*, the constitutional party, whose influence was most extensive and predominant.

The pride of the allied sovereigns refused to acknowledge him, after the proceedings at Vienna; but, *if he had then abdicated in favour*

*of his son, or established a republic, in either case the coalition would have separated.**

With a too hastily composed force of *one hundred and forty thousand* disposable men, he preferred to conquer his recognition.

His arrangements were so well made, that he obtained all the advantages of a surprise. Victorious over the Prussians, he would, on the same day, have gained a success decisive of the fate of Belgium, if the corps destined to support Ney had not been withdrawn to join the grand army, *without orders*, from a mistaken zeal of the commander, who conceived, by the weight and continuation of the cannonade, that Napoleon stood in need of succour.

The battle of Waterloo, fought with only *eighty thousand* men, and the loss of which may be attributed to the non-arrival of Grouchy with *thirty-six thousand*—to the *revivifying* powers of the Prussians—and the obstinate valour of the English army, annihilated all his military projects and political negotiations.

* The royalists will exclaim *no* ; but it is, nevertheless, *true*.

The *Sovereign* returned to his capital to direct measures, which might repair the disaster ; but instead of alighting at the senate house, and communicating in person the fatal intelligence, of which he was himself the herald—instead of addressing the feelings of men animated by a sense of national honour and patriotism—in an evil moment for his fortunes, he repaired to his palace, retired to a bath, and then sent for Davoust, to whom, on presenting himself, he said, “ I have lost a battle, and must have *three hundred thousand* men and more money to preserve France from invasion.” Davoust replied, he could have neither, and communicated to him the temper of the chambers, which rumours of his misfortune had rendered more hostile and unmanageable. He received the intelligence without any expression of violence. Shortly afterwards, it was communicated to him, that he must abdicate in favour of his *son* ; and a *correspondence was shown him*, which induced him to believe, that *some* of the allied powers would be content with that act, and respect the order of succession, which, in case of *death or abdication, guaranteed the throne to his offspring.*

Dissatisfied with the opposition which had been made to his measures since his arrival at Paris—conscious that he was betrayed by those, whom he was obliged to employ, and to whom he had said, “You think to get rid of me and survive ; but remember, *if I perish, you are the next victims, and then France*”—and anxious to secure the throne to his dynasty, he acquiesced, and retired to Malmaison, where he spent his time with the members of his family and in the circle of a few friends.

He was not however indifferent to the military or political crisis, which every hour became more imminent ; and, when he found the remnant of the allied armies, which had fought at Waterloo, advancing on the capital, without awaiting any co-operation or reinforcements, he sent to the provisional government, offering “to put himself at the head of the considerable force then collected for the defence of Paris, and, profiting by the false movement of his enemy, obtain a victory (of which he felt certain), and *time* for the issue of the negotiations with the allied sovereigns.” He added, “that he would act only as a *genc-*

ral, and engage to retire from the command at the orders of the provisional government."

The fear however of his reassuming the imperial authority, if success again restored to him the attachment of the public (for the troops never for a moment felt any relaxation of their devotion), but ill disposed some to his proposition; whilst the engagements already entered into by others with a part of the allies, induced a total and immediate rejection of his services—a rejection, which, he persists in saying to this day, "entailed on France all her subsequent misfortunes; whilst this movement on Paris, which from its rashness should have ruined the allies, consummated their triumph, and gave them for a second time possession of the capital*."

The Greek theologians opened the gates of Byzantium to the professors of the Koran, by discussing controversial points of the Chris-

* Napoleon perhaps was not aware, that the movement of the allies was regulated by *political* arrangements in Paris.

tian religion, instead of arraying and arming the population against the invader. The constitutionalists were no less *accessary to the subjugation of their country*. The King had scarcely any friends—not one, who would encounter any danger for him, as experience had proved—Napoleon had a considerable proportion of the people, and all the army in his favour ; but the constitutionalists had acquired the ascendancy in the chambers, and had great support throughout the whole of France. Their intentions were honest ; but confidence in the promises of an invader is *folly unpardonable in any guardians of public safety* : and their conduct in checking the national enthusiasm, and finally suffering their only shield to be removed, when France so uncovered could present but a naked body at the breach, was insanity inflicted by destiny for the accomplishment of her course.

Napoleon, finding the armies of the allies approach, and the wish being frequently repeated, that he should withdraw, determined at last on his journey ; but not until the Prussians had approached so near, that it had

been found necessary to burn the bridge of Malmaison*.

Napoleon, with Count Bertrand, departed at three o'clock in the afternoon on the 29th of June. He appeared to quit Malmaison with great regret. The image of the Empress Josephine had never been weakened in his recollections.

The suite followed by different routes, and the rendezvous was at Niort. Such was the secrecy observed, that the postmasters, and even the postillions, who had driven Napoleon, refused to tell the road he had taken; and one of his officers could not rejoin him until two days after his arrival at Rochfort. Still, as the imperial arms had only been slightly painted over, the sun and dust reproduced them; so that he was recognized along the whole road, when all the national guards and constituted authorities crowded to offer their homage, as if he had not abdicated.

* For farther interesting and accurate information on the subject of Napoleon's abdication, see Hobhouse's Letters from Paris.

At Poitiers, the son of Madame Bertrand being taken for the *young Emperor*, his name being Napoleon, the crowd collected in such numbers from all quarters, and the cries of devotion to his cause were so strong, that Madame Bertrand, then travelling under the name of Dillon, could with difficulty withdraw her child before break of day.

Guards of hussars and chasseurs à cheval accompanied the carriages from Niort, and additional precautions were taken, in consequence of the neighbourhood of the road to La Vendée; but these apprehensions were not warranted, for the same enthusiasm existed here as everywhere else on his journey, and many of the towns and hamlets on the road as far as Rochfort were even illuminated.

Here Napoleon deliberated, whether he should allow his frigates to force a passage for him through the British blockading squadron, as their captains had gallantly volunteered to attempt—whether he should embark clandestinely for America—a vessel being ready to receive him (*and which in fact sail-*

ed without observation)—or whether he should surrender himself into the power of a nation, whose generosity he hoped to find equal to her greatness. He did not anticipate, or seek, as the Indian monarch, to be treated “like a king;” but he did not expect the refuge of a prison in a country, which he had been taught to regard as the sanctuary of liberty.

Negotiations commenced, and ended as is known; but to the last moment he was on the shore he continued to experience the consolation, which the expression of attachment offers to misfortune.

In Captain Maitland, Napoleon had the good fortune to find an officer, who knew how to combine his duty with good feeling and good taste*—an officer, whose high sense of honour and generosity was subsequently afforded an occasion for its exercise, in a correspondence which will hereafter redound to the credit of himself and his country, without,

* The same eulogiums were passed by Napoleon on Admiral Hotham, on arriving at Portsmouth.

it is to be hoped (and subsequent circumstances authorise the presumption), affixing any imputation on its government.

On a rock in the centre of the ocean Napoleon is now, according to unprejudiced reports, contemplating adversity with the equanimity of a philosopher, and encountering his mortifications with a dignity of mind, which even his most bitter enemies must admire.

His abdication having been only given on conditions which have not been fulfilled, he cannot, as an emperor, feel the tranquillity which attended Charles in the cloister, nor that attachment to retirement, which enabled Dioclesian to reply to the solicitations of Maximilian for the resumption of the purple, "If I could but show him the cabbages, which my own hands planted at Salona, he would no longer urge me to relinquish the enjoyment of happiness for the pursuit of power:" but although he may be ambitious of the redemption of his glory, and the transmission of the sceptre into the hands of his son, he appears not to regret the lost osten-

tations of royalty, or to be insensible to the comforts of a private condition, if he could enjoy its independence and security.

The allied sovereigns certainly possessed the respect and confidence of the French nation, even at that time. This confidence had *paralysed* the national exertion, and now left France to the *mercy* of the invaders. Still the spirit was high in Paris, and the means of defence sufficient against that part of the allied army which was then approaching; but the public ardour was suppressed, and the *arms withheld* from the *Federès*, whose increasing impatience to obtain them rendered the situation of persons suspected to be in the interest of the Bourbons very perilous.

Couriers were dispatched to urge the advance of the allied generals, that a popular insurrection might be prevented.

Davoust unwillingly agreed to the subsequent convention, in virtue of which the French army evacuated the city.

The arrival of Alexander was hourly expected. It was known that *he* would *not* force Louis on the French people, but take the sense of the chambers on the government to be established. Not a moment was to be lost. Forms were no longer maintainable; without risk to the interests of the *new* object, and *new* term, legitimacy! Guards were mounted at the Thuilleries, and senate houses; whilst the doors were closed; and *bayonets presented to the breast of deputies*; who insisted on entrance*.

When Alexander arrived, he found Louis in possession, and submitted to necessity, with the expression of those courtesies, which veiled from public observation his feeling of disappointment.

Alexander, however, was not the Alexander of the year 1814. The French acknowledged, that he resisted the *dismemberment of France*: that he did not directly sanction the *plunder* of

* One hundred and forty deputies, whose names are in the author's possession, protested against this violence.

the *Louvre*, and the removal of *the horses belonging to the no longer existing republic of Venice!* that he remonstrated against the excesses of the Prussians and interposed his good offices for the people: but although his policy sought their favour, he no longer appeared to countenance or cherish those liberal principles, that zeal for popular or constitutional rights, of which a short time past he had been the advocate and the champion!

He saw the French nation, bound hand and foot, delivered over to the prisons and scaffolds of a vindictive government.

Notwithstanding his manifestoes, his proclamations, and his pledges, he permitted the convention of Paris to be violated: and to that violation was not he a party, who had made himself one of the guarantees of the treaty, by not protesting against any, and profiting by many of its enactments?

So much has been said and written about this convention, that the case is familiar to the public; but it is a transaction which deeply

affects the character of the allies and the interests of posterity; and it is much to be feared may one day entail a terrible retaliation!

Much sophistry and subtlety of argument has been used to evade the precise stipulations of the *twelfth* and *fifteenth* articles*.

* "ART. XII. Seront pareillement respectées les personnes et les propriétés particulières; les habitans, et *en general*, tous les individus qui se trouvent dans la capitale, continueront à jouir de leurs droits et libertés, sans pouvoir être inquiétés ni recherchés en rien, relativement aux fonctions qu'ils occupent ou auraient occupées, à leur conduite, et à leurs opinions politiques."

"ART. XV. S'il survient des difficultés sur l'exécution de quelqu'un des articles de la présente Convention, l'interprétation en sera faite *en faveur de l'armée Française et de la ville de Paris.*"

Official Translation.

"ART. XII. Private persons and property shall be equally respected. The inhabitants, and, *in general*, all individuals, who shall be in the capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties, without being disturbed or called to account, either as to the situations which they hold or may have held, or *as to their conduct or political opinions.*

ART. XV. If difficulties arise in the execution of any one of the articles of the present Convention, the interpre-

The Royalists of France say, the king was no party; and that a king cannot be bound by the arrangements or promises of *foreign generals*, that he should not administer *his own* laws: but a convention, according to all the writers on the laws of nations, and the usages of war, is binding on those who *sign* and on those who *benefit* by the instrument; for no party in law can select the advantage, and then reject the inconvenience by denial of par-

tation of it shall be made *in favour of the French army and of the city of Paris*.

Labedoyere, Ney, Lavalette, Mouton Duvernet, and others, were not only inhabitants, but peers exercising their functions. The two former withdrew some days after the entrance of the king at the intreaty of persons, who knew the *royal* intention not to *respect the convention*. Lavalette, confiding in his *innocence*, walked to the prison gates and surrendered himself, when the lists of proscription were published.

The French commissioners and Davoust swore at Ney's trial they intended to cover, by the twelfth article, all persons whatsoever, remaining in Paris, from the persecution of *any* government, which might be *restored or established*; and scouted the notion of their having proposed to secure them from the allies, who had no *right*, and could have no inclination, to punish *political* opinions or conduct.

icipation in the contract. Count Macirponi, however, says, and his assertion has never been contradicted, that Talleyrand, the *minister of Louis*, was present on the morning of the 4th of July, when the Duke of Wellington, Sir Charles Stuart, and Pozzo di Borgo were assembled in council; and that Talleyrand, turning to the Duke, requested him to read to the Count the capitulation they had just concluded.

It was, however, of no consequence to the people of Paris whether the king agreed or not. The allied commanders had guaranteed their safety against all persecutions for political opinions and conduct; and, if remonstrance failed, they were bound to protect them by force of arms! Europe was also obliged to support these measures, and maintain the plighted faith, as much and even more than she was to avenge political injuries.

An English nobleman, whose acquaintance with the public laws of nations and the duties of honour is commensurate with his natural benevolence, when writing on that subject, to produce a decision in unison with his sense of justice, observed:—

"What is passing at Paris distresses me more than I can describe—for Lavalette, on the score of private acquaintance, though slight, I am much concerned; but from regard to the character of our country, I have conceived more horror at the trials and executions going on in the teeth of our capitulation than mere humanity could create. How can it be asserted that the impunity for political conduct extends only to impunity from the allies for offences committed against them? Where ships strike—where garrisons surrender—do the captains or commanders stipulate, that the foreign conqueror shall not molest their former political exertions? With or without such stipulations, what shadow of right has a foreign enemy to punish individuals for opinions held or conduct pursued in their own country?

"It is clear, the impunity promised was impunity for crimes, real or supposed, against a French government. If the French government was a party to that promise, by that promise it must abide. If not, the other allies are bound in honour not to deliver over a town taken in virtue of it, without exacting the

same terms from those to whom they deliver it.

“ Had we taken Martinique in 1793 or 1794, on a promise of not molesting individuals for political operations or conduct, should we have been at liberty to cede it, had Louis XVIII. been then restored, without insisting on the impunity of all political offences; or, at the very least, on the right of leaving the country for such as might have so offended?

“ In Egypt, the French stipulated, that no persons should be molested for their conduct or opinions during the war. We took military possession of the country on those terms, and delivered it over to the *political* authority of the Ottoman Porte. When, however, the Captain Pacha acting under that authority began murdering the Beys, and proceeding against the adherents of the French, we not only remonstrated and threatened, but we actually protected the persecuted men within our lines” (and* Lord Hutchinson marched the British army in line of battle, with loaded guns, on

* Observation of the Author.

the Pacha's camp, giving to the Captain Pacha *but five minutes to surrender the living and the dead in his possession*)*. "What would have been done by the English commander in Spain, if the troops had surrendered any town to the French with a similar stipulation; and if, on the flimsy and hypocritical subterfuge of a distinction between king Joseph's Spanish government and the French military authorities, all the Spaniards, who had assisted us during the siege, had been prosecuted for treason against Joseph?"

Again, in another letter, an illustrious advocate of justice remarks, on the subject of the fifteenth article. "Observe Lord Bathurst's Letter, and couple it with the article, which stipulates, that any doubts shall be construed, in *favour* of the army and the inhabitants of Paris. Now there was a doubt, not only in the minds of both interested and impartial men, but in the minds of the Prince Regent and Lord Bathurst; a doubt so strong as to make the former hesitate in ratifying or approving the capitulation.

* Sir Sidney Smith had already consecrated in Egypt and Arabia the good faith of England.

“ It is true, that one of the contracting parties solved that doubt, and the capitulation was ratified ; but how was it solved ? Not by saying the *words* were *clear*, but that the *intention* was *unquestionable* ; and, by saying *that*, not to the *public*, not to *Paris*, not to the *French*, but to *Lord Bathurst* and the *Prince*. But what signifies *intentions* when there is an express article saying, that if doubts arise on the text they shall be construed in favour of the *people of Paris*. Doubts arising, or expressions liable to doubt being used, are in these cases the same thing. Such words were used in this *Convention*, by the recorded admission, nay by the suggestion of the *British Government* ; and yet, when an *officer of the army*, and an *inhabitant of Paris*, says, ‘ the article is *doubtful*, give me the *advantages of the favourable interpretation* ;’ you, who have *yourself* expressed the doubt, answer, ‘ there was none in *my intention*,’ which is nothing to the point, and there could not be in your *expectation*, which is still less to the point. The question is, *Is the article susceptible of the most favourable interpretation ?* If so, Ney and the French have a right to the benefit of it, and Lord Bathurst has recorded the

Prince Regent's apprehension, that is, *his doubt*, that it may admit of such a construction."

Another nobleman, whose virtues adorn his country, and whose eloquence appals its domestic enemies, wrote at the same time, and urged similar arguments (but the extracts cited, *technically* and *substantially*, embrace all the subject); and whilst the sentiments do honour to the individuals, and in some measure redeem the character of England, they augment regret, that men, who could so feel, had not the power to decide a question affecting the security of the whole civilized world.

When *might* did not make *right*—when fundamental laws were not suspended, because the accused had committed no offence *amenable to law*—the arguments of the *publicist* would engage much attention; but now they are put on record only as a protest against the imitation of a pernicious precedent.

Louis had declared in the senate, that he was resolved to *remain* and *die* on his throne; but a precipitate change of intention, as the

danger approached, had determined him to fly; and such was the hurry of his departure, that every paper was left in the Thuilleries.

Napoleon instantly ordered the *private* correspondence to be burnt, that all fear of punishment or persecution might be removed! But amongst the *public* documents, he found the *memorandum* of a treaty projected between France and Austria adverse to Russia; which he communicated to Alexander.

Alexander was surprised with making some slight reproaches for ingratitude, but insisted on an unequivocal promise of better faith.

Richlieu, who had been for many years Russian governor at Odessa, of which city he may indeed be called the creator, and where his name is held in esteem, was nominated prime minister; and thus Russia not only balanced the influence of England, but obtained an *ascendancy in the French cabinet*.

The use, however, that Richlieu made of the name and authority of the allied powers in his

discourse to the chamber of peers, when he ventured to declare "that, in *the name of all Europe* (the sovereigns and armies of Europe then being in possession of Paris), he came thiere to conjure and *require* them to judge Marshal Ney," for an instant hazarded the displeasure of Alexander, who found, that although he could confide in the friendly dispositions, he could not trust the discretion or moderation of his former servant*.

Alexander, profiting by the inopportune and injudicious conduct of his allies, endeavoured again to ingratiate himself with the French people. His allies maintained a strict discipline in his proclamations, abandoning contributions, and distributing largesses to the inhabitants, who had suffered by the passage of the allied troops, were circulated with industry ; and his avowed opposition to the designs of Austria, Prussia, and Holland, for the dismemberment of France, obtained him many partizans : but the French nation, the sport and the

* The allied ministers, to their credit, gave in notes of strong remonstrance against this indecorous attempt to influence judicial proceedings.

victim of so many vicissitudes of fortune, and so many despotisms, required constitutional security, and a system of government, which would restore and preserve the action of laws consonant with public liberty.

The breach of solemn promises, notwithstanding the wreck occasioned by their violation, might have been pardoned, if the violence had not continued to the extinction of independence, and the infraction of all *representative* rights*.

It was in vain for Alexander to multiply his boons, and profess his sympathy for the sufferings of the French people. They were no longer the dupes of words. They saw him sanctioning the executions and the proscriptions, which a weak and cruel government was unable to perpetrate, *without the presence* of the *allied armies*. They saw France subjugated, as Spain had already been, to the yoke of despotism and superstition, without any remonstrance from the *deliverers of Europe* ; and they viewed Alexander but as a member of that con-

* Acknowledged the succeeding year by the king himself, in a royal ordinance.

federacy, which has at length converted this quarter of the globe into one common prison, where innocence can *command* no safety, and misfortune find no *inviolable* asylum—a confederacy, which seems to propose by inquisitions, standing armies, censors, prevotal courts, police ministers, spies, informers, proscriptions, alien bills, laws of suspicion and suspension, to extinguish the spirit of liberty in *each* hemisphere, and brutalize mankind.

A detail of the intrigues, diplomatic jealousies, and collisions, which characterized the under plot of the conspiracy, would be interesting, but disgusting—the development must be left for other times.

Alexander, having accomplished all his designs, and maintained a supremacy which the *rival* powers did not dare to dispute, quitted France to review his armies, visit Prussia, receive the homage of Poland, and return to his capital, there to conciliate a growing discontent at his absence, and repair the mischiefs, which it had occasioned to private interests and to various branches of the public service.

The Nobles thought he was becoming a *foreigner*, and they required a *Russian monarch*; but these were only the ill-humours of a day; the glory acquired to the *Russian name*, and the vast increase of power added to her sceptre, ensured him the applause and allegiance of a class enamoured of autocracy, elated with glory, and ambitious of national aggrandizement.

Alexander, however, did not trust to *force alone* for the prosecution of his future designs, or the maintenance of his ascendancy. He knew, that family alliances, at *variance* with national policy, would never preserve permanent influence; but he also was sensible that, when they were made in *unison* with it, they were additional securities, monitors, and guards.

The marriage, which would have united *England and Holland*, was always conceived, by the continental statesmen, calculated to involve Europe in wars against natural interests, and the negotiations from the commencement were viewed with great and unconcealed jealousy.

The presumed alliance was no sooner broken off, than Russia directed her attention to the advantages which she might derive from a family interest being established on the throne of Holland.

Her fleets, shut up in the Baltic half the year by the seasons, were (especially since the destruction of the Swedish and Danish navies) costly superfluities rather than an useful establishment adding to her importance or assisting her interests. The waters of the Texel and the Scheldt would afford powers of navigation, administering to all *immediate* objects, and contributive to more *remote* designs.

Holland, as a *maritime* state, could not be injured by a *maritime* auxiliary, over whose fleets she was the guardian; and the alliance with Russia assured that *military* support, which she required for the preservation of her continental possessions.

To Russia, Holland was a *tete du pont*, or advanced work, which awed France, and which aided the control over Prussia. To Holland.

Russia was a protecting ally against both those powers, with a spear and a shield to defend her from England.

Reciprocal benefits, so unequivocal and so considerable, were apparent to both parties; and the Grand Duchess Anne, who might, it is believed, have mounted *the throne of France*, having accepted the proposals of the Prince of Orange, is destined to succeed to another throne, which she is equally qualified to grace.

The position of Wurtemberg was not of equal importance; but still the extension of Russian influence in Germany, where already Weimar, Baden, and Oldenburgh were under its sway, was desirable.

A young and gallant prince, whose military services were then considered to be the least of his claims to public esteem, was married to a princess of Bavaria. Separation took place instantaneously after the ceremony, as the marriage had been compulsive. Divorce was obtained*, and the Grand Duchess Catharine,

* The virtues of this princess have since placed her on the throne of Austria.

whose *name*, activity, talents, and attachment to her native country, rendered her the general object of its affection, was established in succession to a kingdom, of whose reigning monarch Napoleon said, "If that man had but *fifty thousand* soldiers, he would weave me a more difficult web than any I have ever had to disentangle."

Personal feelings, as well as policy, suggested the connection just solemnized at St. Petersburg with a princess of Prussia—a connection full of recollections to bind, if any human arrangement can permanently bind, the friendship between crowns.

Having thus traced a summary narrative of the principal points and facts, which characterized the policy of Russia, and have tended to her aggrandizement—a summary which will acquire *interest* the *more* it is examined and the *more* it is developed—the question may be investigated which has been proposed, *viz.*, *how far any combination of France, England, and Austria, can control the policy Russia may be disposed to pursue?*

In order, however, to fix the dates, so various, in remembrance, it may be useful to recapitulate them in chronological order.

In the years between 1701 and 1711, the Czar Peter was contending, with various success, against the Swedes, Turks, and Poles, for an advance of his European frontier.

In the year 1713, having conquered Riga and Livonia, he built the city of Petersburg, transporting *thirty thousand* persons from Archangel to be the inhabitants, and inviting foreigners, particularly the English, to settle there.

In the year 1714, he developed his naval projects, which have been *suspended*, but never *abandoned* by his successors.

In the year 1721, he declared himself Emperor of all the Russias, and on his death, in 1729, the world added, and preserved to his memory, the posthumous title of "The Great."

From the year 1729 to 1762, although Russia, under *six* sovereigns, some of whose reigns

were short and tragical, proceeded in the attainment of internal strength, solidity, and trade—although, in the reign of Elizabeth, she had connected herself with England, and acquired military character, still she had not taken her station as a great European power.

When Catharine the Second mounted the throne, only *twenty-two millions* of people paid her homage.

During her reign of *thirty-three* years, according to the best authorities of the time, the number was augmented to nearly *thirty-six millions*, by acquisition and natural increase of population*.

The computation may be made as follows :—

Seven millions of Poles (including Courlanders) acquired in the partitions, commencing with the confederation of Bar, and concluding with the capture of Prague in 1795.

* It is generally admitted, that there is an annual increase of *three hundred thousand* souls in the whole population : but vide Geographical Memorandum affixed to the Map.

Two millions and a half of inhabitants of the New Servia (on the north of the Crimea, between the Boristhenes and the Don). The descendants of *sixty thousand* families of Servia, who emigrated in the reign of Maria Theresa from Hungary, the Bannat, and Croatia, in consequence of religious intolerance*, to whom Catharine, profiting by the occasion, offered an asylum and money.

Her hospitality was rewarded by the cultivation of neglected lands, until they have become some of the most flourishing countries of European Russia, under the name of the government of Catherinenslaw and Wosnesenski; a colony, which has preserved with the parent provinces a connection always injurious to Turkey, and becoming hourly more alarming to Austria.

Half a million of Germans, and other set-

* At the head of the list stands Miloradovich, the pupil of Suwarrow, and the competitor for fame with Bagrathion. Amongst the other distinguished families are—Scherich, Teckely, Horwath, Zorich, Dubasarski, Sterich, Narancich, Ivelick, Mirascewich.

tlers, of which there are not less than *forty thousand* in the city of Petersburg.

Two millions in the government of Caucasus, Siberia*, Little Tartary, the Tartary of the Nogais, the Crimea, &c. &c. &c., exclusive of various Nomade people, who now supply irregular cavalry to the armies of Russia, and which contribute importantly to their efficiency.

These *twelve millions* of people Catharine subjected to the *military conscription*, and Europe has seen soldiers from all of them twice enter the capital of France!

In this reign of naval and military exertion, *territorial aggrandizement* and political consequence made advances equally rapid on every side.

The storm of Ismail had given her soldiers a reputation for active courage as well deserved as that, which they had obtained for patient fortitude at the battle of Cunnensdorff; whilst

* Siberia was first invaded by Ivan II; Peter the Great extended the conquest; but Catharine II completed the acquisition.

the naval victory of Tchecmé enabled her to erect a proud rostral column in view of Constantinople!

Her will was the fiat of fate to surrounding nations, who, although fighting *under the banners of liberty*, contended in vain. To the day of her death kings and philosophers conspired to feed her ambition and gratify her pride.

Paul extended the military force, and the battle of Novi and the Trebia added to the laurels of Russia*. She did not, indeed, acquire any in Holland, but none faded in Switzerland, notwithstanding severe reverses.

Alexander commenced his reign in the year 1800, over *thirty-six millions* of people; but his armies were not numerous enough for his extensive possessions, and the increasing military force of the several great states of Europe.

* Paul, as has been said, had faults; but he also had virtues: amongst these was generosity; and he gave an interesting proof of it when he released the gallant Kosciusko.

His military system wanted that organization, which was but imperfect in any one branch of government.

The acquisitions of his predecessors had been enormous; but they had not yet completed the line of frontier, which the acquisitions themselves required for their preservation.

The guns of the Swedes could be heard in Petersburg: the Poles of Warsaw were *suspicious* neighbours, and the Poles of Russia *doubtful* friends: the Turks in Asia were still inclined to struggle for the recovery of the Crimea, from which they were not a stone's throw: the Turks in Europe still occupied Bessarabia, and held the Russians in check on the Dniester.

Georgia, in which but partial lodgments had been made, was always disturbed. The mountains of the Caucasus were full of *hostile* tribes, and Persia, by the possession of the province of Shirvan, presented a salient and offensive frontier, from which it fed a war, that cost the Russians annually great sums of money and caused much waste of life. Denmark and Swe-

den had considerable navies. Aland covered the Swedish coast from insult or sudden invasion, when the Gulph of Bothnia might be frozen; and Sweaborg commanded the navigation of the mouth of the Gulph of Finland.

The finances were deranged, and the administration of government in the different provinces was expensive, without being productive.

To what extent Alexander has accomplished all his undertakings, without forgetting the interests he was bound to protect, may be difficult to prove, since there is no direct mode to ascertain the opinion of his subjects by the discussions of a *free press*; but as far as the prevalence of tranquillity in every province under his sway—as far as ostensible improvements, in all military œconomy, and general order in all branches of the administration—can authorize the presumption, an extraordinary amelioration must have taken place.

Bodies of recruits, of which three-fifths used to perish in the journey, now arrive with no

more than common casualties ; and so far from the spirit of the people being worn down by demands for military service and augmentation of taxes, patriotism has acquired devotional ardour, and the state has not found it necessary to impose any additional burthens upon its inhabitants.

The ground on which the town of Odessa now stands did not contain, in the year 1794, one house or inhabitant : now there are one thousand houses in stone, and above forty thousand residents. Eight hundred ships annually sail from the port ; and such quantities of corn are exported, that this part of the world, as in the time of the Greeks and Romans, promises to be the chief granary of the Mediterranean,

Tcherkaz, near the mouth of the Don, in the sea of the Azof, is no less prosperous.

Astrakan, at the mouth of the Volga, by the last treaty with Persia (which gives the exclusive navigation of the Caspian Sea to the Russian flag) has obtained equal advantages.

The *internal navigation* from the White and Baltic to the Caspian and Black Seas has been improved by various great works, and others are in progress.

The city of Petersburg has been embellished at the expense of *five millions of roubles annually*; so that three-fourths of the houses are now *palaces of stone*, and the city itself has become the most magnificent in the world, for its buildings, its quays, its canals, and “the pellucid waters” of the majestic Neva.

The impulse has not been confined to the European provinces; but Siberia, to which such terrible images have been attached, from the supposed intolerable rigour of its climate, and its associating ideas of misery and unjust suffering, is become a *fertilized and productive* country, inhabited by *voluntary* settlers—amongst them many foreigners; and not only the city of Tobolsk, enriched by every species of European and Asiatic luxury, is growing into a very considerable capital, distributing civilization around—but Irkoutsk also, at the distance of *three thousand seven hundred and seventy-*

four miles from Moscow, and not *four hundred* from the frontier of China, has become the seat of a considerable and flourishing government.

Communications are open in all directions, even to Kamtschadska and the fort of St. Peter and St. Paul, at the distance, (by Okotsk, in the Pacific), of *eight thousand seven hundred and thirty* miles from Moscow.*

Reports are regularly received from every government, and arrive generally at the prescribed day, and from most of them at the same hour.

In no country in the world is *travelling* so cheap, or so secure against robbers ; and within the last half dozen years large inns have been erecting, under the order of the Emperor, at all the principal European post stations.

* It must not be forgotten, that the communications are greatly facilitated by the sledge conveyance. Merchandize can be transported on sledges in one winter, which would require two summers water carriage. The journey from Okotsk is performed in less than three months.

Manufactories of all descriptions have been established, and particularly in iron, which is worked with a delicacy that rivals the artists of any country.

Carriages, which heretofore were imported from England, are now made under the original instruction of German and English builders, with such good and cheap materials, as to render the prohibition of importation a matter of no regret.

Cloth manufactories are receiving great encouragement from the government, and the late events on the continent have added largely to the *manufacturing* and *mechanic* population.

The ports of Cronstadt, of Riga, and Revel, have not only been opened again to the trade with all Europe, but America is becoming a competitor of such importance as to render Russia no longer dependent on the English market: and thus the preference promised the English merchants by Peter the Great, when he addressed William the Third in Holland, in the year 1697, and the privileges subsequently

granted, have been cancelled, or rather not renewed, on an alleged principle of general justice.

At the same time, the doctrines inculcated by La Harpe have not been neglected in *Russia*. *Slavery* has not only been divested of many of its most disgusting features ; but great progress has been made towards its abolition by the regulations as well as the example of the Emperor.

The nobles of Esthonia have lately declared, that, at the expiration of a few years, necessary for intermediate arrangements, useful to the peasant as well as to the proprietor, slavery shall no longer exist in their province ; and there is every reason to expect a more general extension of this policy will not be long protracted.

A disposition, manifested by the Emperor, to introduce preliminary measures for the establishment of a *constitutional* government, was rejected by the senate, who declared for the maintenance of an *autocracy*. But if the *senate*

at that time had been as liberally disposed as the *sovereign*, the frame of a representative government might have been formed, to keep pace with the progress of education.

While such are the characteristics of internal improvement, the indications of external greatness, in her foreign relations, are no less unequivocal.

It has been said already, when Alexander came to the throne *thirty-six millions* of people acknowledged his authority; but at this day, by increase and acquisition, there cannot be less than *forty-two millions* at the LOWEST calculation; and not of Asiatic houseless hordes, wandering in deserts, but chiefly of Europeans, situated in territories, whose military and political value to Russia does not merely consist in an augmentation of her revenue and her number of souls, but, as will be shown hereafter, in CONTRACTING her line of defence, and at the same time affording her powers of advance to positions, that must, if properly occupied, secure the *command* of Europe and of Asia!

So many *millions* of people, of different religions, language, and climate, subjected to one crown, might induce some statesmen, who reason from analogies without the opportunity of practical observation, to calculate on a separation of the empire; to suppose, that its extension will be its destruction; that it is

—— like a circle in the water,
Which never ceaseth to enlarge itself,
Till, by broad spreading, it disperse to nought.

These speculations would be applicable if there were *progressive expansion of frontier—uncovered, or disconnected lines of communication—colonial restraints on incorporated countries—religious intolerance, even of the slightest kind—political proscriptions from prejudice or jealousy of the stranger*: but Russia having conquered, is content to enjoy her conquests with moderation; in all countries she respects the creed, indulges the manners, and maintains the laws she finds, if they are not adverse to those of humanity: her motto is, *Me Rebus*, rather than *Mihi Res*: she does not seek proselytes, she only desires subjects; to whom all the civil and military offices of the state are open, according to their talents

and services*; to whom she grants indiscriminately not only "*jus civitatis*, not only the *jus commercii*, *jus connubii*, *jus hereditatis*, but also the *jus suffragii* and *jus honorum*." In Asia she is Asiatic—in Europe, European—in America (according to Vancouver and all subsequent navigators) she is American. If pre-eminent, she does not display an insulting pre-eminence—she can follow as well as lead, and amalgamate with indigenous customs and habits, however heterogeneous.

It was this system of legislation and connexion which preserved the Fins, the Lithuanians, the Courlanders, the Podolians, the Wolhynians, the Sarmates, and the Tartars in general, in their allegiance, and animated the Cossacks of the Don and the Wolga, with enthusiastic zeal in the service of a power against whose dominion they had so long contended.

* Alexander has given another example of his judgment in the selection of officers, by appointing Woronzow to the command of the army in France; which appointment, like all his former preferment, is not the reward of adulation; but an acknowledgment of services and merits which justly entitle him to the full confidence of his sovereign.

There is no doubt that insurrection might have been produced in the Polish provinces, by a declaration of the independence of Poland; but the temptations of all the combined circumstances under which that invasion took place, could alone have produced the voluntary dismemberment of the empire. These circumstances can never present themselves again: there is no other Napoleon: there is no France connected by a federative system with the Vistula, and moving all Europe in support of Poland's re-establishment: there was not at that time, a Polish monarchy under the Russian crown; a Russia, with nearly *six hundred thousand* men, exclusive of the Polish army. Austria had not then abandoned Warsaw, to extinguish the chance of being called upon by France to surrender Galicia; and, *above all*, there had not been a *Congress at Vienna*.

Poland has now her vanity gratified, although all her objects are not obtained; she has her national existence re-organized; she has her own laws, her own language, her own army, and her territory free from the charge of other troops: she has obtained great diminution of

imposts, and her revenue is applied to the improvement of her own soil, and the reparation of her sufferings.

The Prussian government laid out large sums of money in building towns and promoting industry; but it wished to extirpate Polish remembrances by Prussian laws, German language, and annihilation of all national military establishments: it had therefore generated antipathies unconquerable.

Austria, always a *hundred* years behind the passing age, introduced all the odious exactions and restrictions which characterize her system of political economy; and which not only check the general prosperity, but expose to great peril the stability of her dominions.

Poland knows, that both Prussia and Austria opposed her re-establishment as a monarchy: she can, therefore, have no faith in any future professions, if they should encourage efforts for total independence; and as little confidence would be placed in their military powers to accomplish the object, if sincerely proposed.

Poland also knows, that in case she draws the sword against Russia, her own country, along an open and extensive frontier, must be the theatre of war.

In forming the van of Russia, she either enjoys tranquillity ; or, if she marches, is certain, from the weight of supporting force, and the offensive advantages of her salient position, to carry the ravages into a foreign territory.

Now let the reader consider the station taken by Russia ; her immense acquisitions, the bold line of her frontiers, and her domineering influence over the whole world.

The importance, however, of these acquisitions cannot be here fully manifested : the map and the intelligence of the observer must supply many inevitable omissions. The object is to show, not what *may* be, but *what is* ; and with that design, to exhibit the profiles, the points, the pinnacles of the vantage-ground on which *Russia* now proudly *reclines* ; for who can talk of the *repose* of ambition ?

In the year 1800, Russia rested her right flank on the *North Sea*; her frontier line traversing Russian Lapland, ran *fifty* miles in advance of the White Sea: then covering the province of Olonetz, approached the Lake Ladoga within *twenty* miles, and fell upon the Gulf of Finland, at the distance of only *one hundred and fifteen* miles in a direct line from Petersburg; so that Sweden not only *commanded* near two thirds of the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland, but ranged herself *in view* of, and at the distance of not more than *thirty* miles from the port of Revel, situated in the province of Livonia, wrested from her by Peter the Great, and which she might always hope to re-occupy, so long as she preserved such contiguity.

The frontier of Russia opposed to the frontier line of *Prussia*, commenced near Memel; and reaching the Niemen, between Tilsitz and Kovno, continued along that river as far as Grodno, when it ran in a southern direction upon the Bug river between Drogutchin and Brest-litov; then descending to Wlodowa, on the frontier of *Austrian Galicia*, continued along that province until it reached the Dniester, near

CHORN, when it followed the course of that river into the *Black Sea*.

On the side of **ASIA**, the frontier was separated from the **TURKISH** possessions by the *Cuban*, a small river, which flows at a little distance from the very narrow strait which divides the *Crimea* from the continent of *Asia*, and connects the *Sea of Azov* with the *Black Sea*. It then continued along that river to its source, and passing in front of *Georgiesk*, and behind or to the northward of the mountains of *Caucasus*, joined the river *Terek*, and followed its course into the *Caspian*.

In the year 1817, the right of the frontier still rests on the *Northern Ocean*, but, advancing a *hundred and sixty* miles, touches the frontier of **NORWAY**, and bends round it for a *hundred and ninety* miles, until it reaches a line drawn due north from the *Torneo*, when it descends on that river, and continues running parallel until it falls into the Gulf of *Bothnia*, intersecting a country through which the Swedish troops always passed into *Finland*, but where, from the severity of the climate and the poverty of the

soil, none can move without previous arrangements.

The difficulty, indeed, of the communication contributed to the loss of the *Swedish* provinces; since Sweden could not sustain with a population of little more than *two* millions of people, and a revenue of not much more than *one* million, the heavy expenditure of men and money*. These difficulties, however, will be less felt by Russia, since the command of the Gulfs of Finland and of Bothnia would facilitate the operations.

A line is then drawn through the Gulf of Bothnia, which sweeping round Aland, regains the continent in the province of Livonia, thus giving to RUSSIA the ports of *Abo* and of *Sveaborg*, which was the great naval establishment of the Swedes on the coast of Finland, and all the numerous islands which cluster between Aland and the main land, and which are inha-

* Before the separation of Finland, the revenue did not exceed *one* million and a *half*, and the debt was considerable. The whole military force amounted to about *fifty thousand* men.

bited by a rich and happy population. But the island of Åland is distant from the shore of Sweden only *twenty-four* miles, from the Archipelago of islands in advance of Stockholm not above *thirty*, and not above *seventy* from Stockholm itself; while the intervening sea is frequently frozen, so that carriages may pass.

Thus Russia has completely CHANGED her relative POSITION with Sweden. Instead of her former vulnerable and humiliating defensive attitude, she not only menaces but awes; and not only awes; but, from a variety of contingent circumstances, all favourable to her authority, she *commands*.

On the *Niemen*, the frontier remains *in statu quo* for about *one hundred* miles; when it traverses the Memel or Niemen river, and running along East Prussia, strikes the Vistula near Thorn, from whence Dantzic is distant about *seventy miles*, and BERLIN only *one hundred and seventy*.

The line then crosses the *Vistula*, and advances to Kalish, a point nearly equidistant

from Dresden and Berlin ; thence taking a southern direction and passing within *thirty* miles of the Oder, it bends in an eastern course along the district of Cracow, which it respects ; but at this point its distance from a third capital, *Vienna*, is again only *one hundred and seventy* miles ; the *Gallician* frontier is then rounded, when the line traverses the *Dniester*, allongates the *Bukovine* frontier*, until it reaches the river *Pruth* ; thus circumventing all *that part of Poland*, except the *Duchy of Posen*, which belonged to *Prussia* by the partition-treaties.

In this position, which may be called the very heart of Europe, she rides alongside the *Brandenburgh* possessions with the lofty and fearful superiority of one of her *hundred and twenty* gun ships over a Prussian galliot, when there is no escape from pressure, and when the weaker must be crushed or overwhelmed.

Notwithstanding the possession of the for-

* The Bukovine is a small district lying between Transylvania and Moldavia, and which has belonged to both these provinces : it contains about *one hundred and thirty thousand* inhabitants, now under the Austrian government.

wrecks of Dantzic, Graudenz, and Colberg; Prussia can never attempt to defend any territory north of the Oder, and her line of fortresses on that river is now the only rampart of Germany, a rampart too of no value, if there are not supporting armies in the field equal or nearly so to the attacking force, and especially in the arm of cavalry; which is almost impossible; since Russia, without any extraordinary exertion, could bring *one hundred and twenty thousand* (regular and irregular) cavalry into action on the *Prussian* frontier.

It is no wonder, then, that *Prussia* interweaves the *myrtle* with the *olive*, that she may preserve the ground for the laurels she has won! Had she a hundred daughters, and *Russia* as many sons, she would willingly unite them all.

On the side of the frontier, from Cracow to the Pruth, the kingdom of *Poland* reposes on a friendly population, and not merely friendly, but one in which the *white eagle* is building, as it were, a native aerie: a territory which, in time of peace, occasions jealousy to the pre-

rent possessor, and which, if the disaffection of the people were less unequivocal, could not be defended in time of war; notwithstanding political considerations render *Slavonian* contact with the *Carpathian* mountains perilous to the *Austrian* monarchy.

The *Russian* frontier having reached the *Pruth*, continues along that river (so disastrous in her history) to its confluence with the *Danube*; when this great artery of Austria, and main support to the Turkish frontier, rolls its streams, now also tributary to the flag of *Russia*, into the waters of the *Black Sea*.

In this position *Russia* is distant only *one hundred* miles from *Transylvania*; about *two hundred and fifty* from *Constantinople* by water, and *three hundred* by land, in a direct line; whilst the two interjacent provinces of *Moldavia* and *Wallachia* are in fact regulated by her policy, though the *Ottoman Porte* retains the *nominal* sovereignty.

Russia had endeavoured to obtain the line of the *Sereth*, when she found that *Austria* was not

willing that she should occupy the whole of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, and throw her frontier upon *Illyria* and the higher *Danube* ; a boundary-line which, in fact, would have uncovered not only *Illyria*, but the Banat, Transylvania, and Hungary ; and brought her within a little more than *two hundred* miles of *Constantinople*.

The preparations of Napoleon had induced Russia to accelerate the signature of peace ; Andréossy's arrival to counteract the negotiations had been fortunately protracted, and the Turkish ministers signed the conditions of a treaty, for which they afterwards lost their heads, on the charge of having received the bribes of Russia.

It is probable that Russia, under the circumstances of the subsequent invasion, might have been persuaded to return to the *Dniester*.

The recovery of Bessarabia was a great object to the *Porte*, on account of the *Danube* line, and it was also desirable for humanity ;

since Moldavia, like Saxony, cut in twain, seen her population divided; and under governments with adverse interests, feels all the sufferings which such policy is calculated to inflict; and which the King of Saxony so well described in his protest, when he observed, "that it had no principle for basis but the convenience of the partitioning powers, and no regard for the welfare and internal relations of the people."

These considerations, added to the importance of pacific relations with Turkey (in virtue of which the Moldavian army was rendered disposable for the very service which it afterwards executed), might perhaps have obtained a voluntary restitution of the Moldavian acquisition, if the future safety of Turkey had then engaged sufficiently the attention of her allies, or if they had exercised the forethought of Alexander at *Abo*; but the occasion was lost, and fortune, like other females, generally resents the slight of proffered favours.

Here then *Russia* stands: no longer menaced in flank or on her communications by the

Uhlans of Poland, but supporting her attitude with the soldiers, the population, and resources of that rich and warlike country!—no longer fearful of a diversion from a SWEDISH army, where kindred ties might still have favoured the operations of the invader. While *Turkey*, deprived of these auxiliaries, abandoned to her daily impoverishing means of defence, sees a danger still more formidable approach on a frontier which heretofore had been inaccessible to any *Giaour** enemy.

After the acquisition of the *Crimea* in 1791, the Cuban river, as before observed, separated the Turkish and Russian frontier. The river itself is of no importance; but from thence a very narrow isthmus formed by a small gulf (through which the waters of the Cuban flow), and the Black Sea, runs for about *twenty* miles to the point of Anapa, where the mountains of Caucasus approach close to the shore, and contract the line of defence to a point.

Now, instead of the *Crescent* waving on the batteries of the Cuban, the *Mahometan* banner,

* Turkish word of contempt for infidels.

replaced by the *Russian eagles*, has been driven across and beyond the navigable *Phasis*, and is not to be found until the river *Bathus* in Armenia presents a feeble barrier, while the *Russian* advanced frontier, supported by the mountain line, which connects *Georgia* with her new position, secures an indisputable sovereignty over the acquired country, and bids defiance to attack.

Thus here, as on the *Swedish*, *Polish*, and *Moldavian* frontier, invulnerable herself, she stands ready to strike and to wound; to hurl her thunder over Asia whenever her policy deems the moment expedient: for her routes of march to all the points which attract her, are now but marches of a few days.

The distance is to Trebisonde, but *eighty* miles; to the western bank of the Euphrates, not above *ninety*; to Arzroum, *one hundred*; to Sinope, *two hundred and seventy*; to Scutari, opposite Constantinople, a little more than *five hundred*; across the *Isthmus* of Asia Minor to Alexandretta* (a seaport town opposite *Cyprus*

* Near this town *Alexander* conquered *Darius* at the battle of *Issus*.

in the *Mediterranean*), and only *sixty* miles from *Aleppo*, little more than *four hundred*; and to the Red Sea from thence not *five hundred*.

Here then she is moreover posted with *perfect* communications, with a *sea* road for the transport of her stores and magazines, awaiting but a signal to advance, and make herself *mistress of those communications along which the Turks in Europe must receive their Asiatic reinforcements*. Here she is posted to lance the *Greek* fire from the shore of the *Bosphorus* on the towers of the *Seraglio*, if the *Sultan* does not obey the *Russian Ukase*!

The guns of *NAPOLÉON* at *ACRE* shook the Ottoman empire to its foundations. If the French armies had been lodged as the Russians now are, on the Danube, and in Armenia, with the Black Sea under their dominion; or if but *one* army could have reached Asia Minor, isolated as that army would have been, and deprived of the advantages which *Russia* possesses by her *religious* connexion with the *Greeks*, there is little doubt but that Armenia a second time would have seen a handful of sol-

diets regarded "as too many for an embassy, and too few for a fight," make before the setting sun her multitudes the chase of their discipline; and that the tricoloured flag would have waved on the walls of Byzantium.

It may be said, however, that PERSIA would march to the aid of the *Mussulmans*, although the *religious* quarrel between these nations renders them deadly enemies, when Christians do not menace the overthrow of both; but *Persia* by the late treaty, made under the AUSPICES OF ENGLAND, is herself prostrate at the feet of *Russia**.

Russia has descended from the mountains! She is no longer struggling against the hostility of *nature* and *barbarians* in the regions of the Caucasus; she has advanced into the plain, and sweeping with her frontier round Georgia, absorbing the *Persian* provinces of Daughistan and Shirvan, so as to consolidate and cement all her possessions, she has raised a pillar of

* The British ambassador obtained the best terms he could; but his inability to procure better, corroborates the assertion of the text, with respect to the present helpless situation of Persia.

her empire at the mouth of the river *Kur*; and to complete her triumph, to remove all rivals, and monopolize commerce, she has stipulated that her flag, and her flag *alone*, shall sweep the *Caspian*.

Thus Persia is humbled to the dust, and her court to eastern dependence and bondage. It is true, that Persia, unfettered by Turkish prejudices, has long solicited, and has at length obtained, the instruction of *Europeans*, of *French* officers, officers of the army of Napoleon *proscribed* by Louis; and it is not probable that they have carried with them feelings of ill will to *Russia* so strong as those towards *England*; that they would rather storm the frozen *Caucasus* than join in an expedition to share the spoil of Asia, and avenge in the East, their humiliations in Europe.

To reach *Tchiran*, the capital of the Shah, the columns have to march only *three hundred* miles; and by the navigation of the Caspian they can be disembarked within *one hundred*! Thus an army might sail from the *Baltic* through an internal navigation from Petersburg to As-

tracan, and landing on the southern shore of the Caspian, pitch their tents within *four hundred* miles of the Persian Gulf; from whence the voyage to *Bombay* is only from *twenty-four* to *thirty* days, in both Monsoons; and to Madras, but *eight* or *ten* days longer in the S. W. Monsoon*.

This, then, is the territorial attitude of *Russia*. But can any power sustain a force sufficient to garrison a frontier, whose *points d'appui* are the Northern Ocean and the Caspian, as well as the frontiers of China and Armenia; on whose line *Swedes, Austrians, Turks, and Persians*, are arrayed with feelings and interests at war with the power that would enslave them?

Can *Russia*, who in the year 1799 had a disposable army of only *fifty thousand men*; in the year 1807, not more than *eighty thousand* to defend both capitals; and in the year 1813, only *three hundred thousand*† on her whole territory,

* Nearchus, the captain of Alexander the Great's fleet, from ignorance of the compass, being obliged to hug the coast, was still only *sixty-one* days actually in his voyage from the Indus.

† *Peter the Great* is said to have had *one hundred thousand* men at *Narva*; but they were troops of that description

after several years preparation; can she, notwithstanding a destructive invasion and wars of such great waste and expenditure, have collected and re-equipped armies sufficient to defend her acquisitions and improve her advantages? The answer is, She can; and Europe and Asia must acknowledge the truth of that assertion: for, both quarters of the globe are overshadowed by the mass of *six hundred and forty thousand* men, which an establishment of *one million two hundred thousand* ranges in order of battle, exclusive of *militia*, Tartar cavalry, &c.

The fact is, that *Russia*, after posting *thirty thousand* men of appropriate force, with artillery, &c. in Finland, *eighty thousand* on the frontier of Gallicia, *sixty thousand* in Moldavia, *thirty thousand* on the frontier of Armenia, as many in Persia, and leaving a reserve of *one hundred thousand* men to sustain these armies, possesses still a disposable force of above *two hundred thousand* infantry, *eighty thousand* cavalry, and *one thousand two hundred* guns better horsed for service than

which present themselves under the image of sheep, whose numbers never concern the wolves, and which *eight thousand Swedes*, being disciplined, conquered.

any artillery or cavalry in the world* ;—an army, than which, there is none more brave, and with which *no other* can march, starve, or suffer physical privations and natural inclemencies. She has moreover a population equal to the needed supply, and to a great portion of whom the habits and sufferings of war are familiar ; while no power in Europe can raise, equip or maintain their forces, with such disdain of the price of blood†.

Such is *Russia*—such has been her gigantic growth within a short century ! The elements of her greatness, no doubt, previously existed, but, like the treasures in the bowels of the earth, they were undiscovered, and, when produced, were still too full of dross for use, without skilful separation.

Ability and audacity have guided the engine ; fortune, and the errors of enemies, have contribut-

* The militia would perform the garrison duties, if all the regular troops were required on emergency in the field. Her *defensive* means, indeed, are so great and various, as to be incalculable.

† The actual pay of a *Russian* soldier is not much above half a crown a month.

ed to its action : at the same time, political morality has been no check on the councils of Russia, and in good truth has seldom been any to the operation of power since the world began. *Asia, Europe, and America*, have scarcely seen the day when this morality has been a shield to the rights, liberties or independence, of the feeble, destitute of all other protection. If, indeed, nature and barbarism did not oppose too formidable obstacles, an army of "deliverers and champions of social order" would soon traverse Africa, and, at the walls of *Tombuctoo*, from the mouths of cannon, on some plea or other, demand submission and tribute ; perhaps, indemnification for the contributions levied by *Hannibal**.

Alexander now wields the huge sceptre of Russia, and displays an ability equal to the task. His philosophical views have indeed been enfeebled by pernicious advisers ; but those who have known him in other days, still cling to the hope that he will not substitute an

* It is said that the Prussians and others now require *four hundred millions of dollars* from France, as an indemnification for expenses during the revolutionary war.

unfeeling policy, of which the pillars are *tyranny*, *ignorance*, and *fanaticism*, for the sentiments of that genuine philanthropy, which must still have possession of his heart, though they do not animate his councils.

If, indeed, Alexander had resisted the enemies of liberty and human happiness—if he had persevered in the wish he once professed, to see governments and nations so constituted, that sovereigns should be only the *executive* representatives of *represented* states, whose action depended not on the *character* of the individual chief, but on *general, fixed, and self-operating principles*; he would have added to his glory, the more illustrious and imperishable title of the “Benefactor to Mankind.”

Now he appears only in the character (and his enemies triumph in the result) of a conqueror, who engages the consideration of the universe by the immensity of his power to do real mischief and problematical good.

How he will employ the vast force at his disposition, is certainly a most interesting ques-

tion. Whether he will take the line of the Vistula or even Oder for himself; push Prussia into Holland; instigate France to imitate England, and complete and terminate her revolution by the election of a sovereign from the family of Nassau; or whether he will enter into negotiations with Austria for a new arrangement of Europe, which may restore the balance; are speculations, which have excited the hopes and fears of many. Whether he will profit by the positions and present superiority of *Russia*, to accomplish other projects long assigned to her system of policy, must interest all governments, not excepting the *government of the East Indies*; whose attention may also be more excited by the information, that *General Yermoloff*, the governor of the *Caucasus* line, who probably at this very moment has reached the *capital of Persia* on an embassy, is an officer of the highest merit and capacity as an administrator as well as a soldier; and that he has gone assisted not only by the *French* officers employed by Napoleon, under Gardanne, in Persia, and whom Alexander, with the exception of three, engaged in the Russian service, but with the Reports and

maps sent by that mission to Napoleon, and which being carried into *Russia* at the time of the invasion, were found during the retreat, in two abandoned tumbrils.

These reports and plans had convinced *Napoleon*, that the expedition to *India* was practicable; and it is a *positive fact*, that he had resolved on sending an united *Russian* and *French* force on that expedition, in case *Russia* had been compelled to make peace on his terms*.

* The names of the officers are :

Gardanne.

Koussian, Secretary.

Lajard, Under Secretary.

Jonainni, Interpreter.

Salvatori, Physician.

Lami.

Bontems.

Verdier.

Fabrics.

Bianchi d'Adad.

Robert.

Marion.

Guidard.

These are all very distinguished officers of engineers and artillery. It is reported that some of them are to proceed on a mission to one of the Indian powers, after a short repose at Tchiran.

There are two additional circumstances most important to influence opinion, if they cannot fix the judgment, as to the further proposed extension of the *Russian* power.

Alexander has already a much larger army than his *defensive* line requires, or his *finances* can justify; and yet he continues to increase his force.

Russia, with a line of coast upon two seas, on which there is not navigation above half the year, and in one of them, the *Baltic*, no competitor, not content with an establishment of above eighty sail of the line in the ports of

Archangel,

Cronstadt,

Revel,

Sevastopol,

Cherson ;

notwithstanding the pressure of the *French* war, has been incessantly building, and is building with increasing activity, the heaviest line of battle ships.

Alexander knows as well as any *British* admiral, that ships of any force or of any amount are

of no value without *seamen* to navigate them; and that *seamen* cannot be formed on inland seas alone. He also knows and feels as well as any economist in *Europe*, that ships are costly vanities, if built only for ostentation. There is no sovereign who would have been less inclined to divert his treasure from state necessities, for the indulgence of this unprofitable pursuit, than *Alexander*.

There is, therefore, evidence amounting to conviction, that he has always proposed to accomplish the instructions of *Peter the Great*, and extend his empire until he can establish that real maritime power which himself and people have coveted more since they have seen so much commercial wealth, or, as they term it, *colonial* gold, flow into their country. *Putant enim, qui mari potitur, eum rerum potiri.*

It is not likely that he will be satisfied with a *Dutch* permit; but whether he will seek to establish himself in the ports of Norway, in Zealand, in the Archipelago, in the Mediterranean; or whether, like the son of *Jupiter Ammon* on the banks of the *Hyphasis*, he will say, "Our empire

shall have no other bounds than those which God has set to the earth"—time will show.

Are then Europe, and Asia, and *America** (of which hemisphere nothing has been said, for the hour is not yet ripe, though it teems with matter of the highest moment to the world), to make no effort for the preservation of their independence?

* It may, however, interest the reader to know that the establishments of the Russians commence at Okotsh, on the Siberian coast, in a bay of the Pacific Ocean, that they extend from thence by Kamschadka to the north-west coast of America, where the principal establishments have been long fixed in the populous island of Kodja (inhabited by hunters, and situated in $57\frac{1}{2}$ degrees north, and $152\frac{1}{2}$ west longitude from Greenwich), and in Norfolk Sound, 57 degrees north, and 135 west longitude; where the fort is so considerable as to be armed with 100 pieces of cannon. Since the year 1813, however, the Russians have descended the American coast, *passed the Columbia river five hundred miles*, and settled in Badoga, at $38\frac{1}{2}$ north, and only *thirty miles from the Spanish establishments in California*; where they not only are trading with great advantage, but are profiting by a fine climate and fruitful soil, to feed their more northern possessions. The passage from the north-west coast of America to the Persian Gulf may be averaged between three and four months; but a ship leaving Busso-rah in April to profit by the S. W. Monsoon, would easily gain the N. W. coast of America in *three months*.

Must the fiat of *Alexander* be the law of the universe? Is *Russia*, like *Rome* under the image of *Milo* the wrestler, to be looking round in vain for an antagonist?

Painful as it is to reflect, that a war for the restoration of the *balance of power* should have ended in the overthrow of all balance; in the substitution of *solid dominion*, for a *momentary authority*; in a *national supremacy*, instead of the supremacy of *one extraordinary man*, subject to all the vicissitudes of fortune and the infirmities of humanity: it is nevertheless *true*; and *so long as France is not reunited to Europe*, so long as she cannot be rendered *contributive to the general system of defence*, every monarch and nation on the continent must owe their existence to the *forbearance of Alexander*.

To verify this assertion, so revolting to pride, and so opposite to expectation, it will be necessary to take a concise but accurate review of the situation in which the several powers cited as the guardians of Europe against the encroachments of *Russia* have been placed by the policy pursued at *Vienna* and at *Paris*.

FRANCE.

When alliances are formed, it is presumed that governments represent the people *governed*, and that the *force* of the nation is at their disposal,

When a combination with France is proposed, *France* ought to suggest the image of a *sovereign* power capable to bring into action the resources and exertions of *twenty-six millions* of people.

Is that, however, the state of France?

Will any man who has been in that country affirm, as the honest belief of his mind, that such an union exists between the *Crown* and the *subjects* as would permit the experiment of armies being formed, under the *banners* of the *lilies*, to march and act in concert with its *allies*?

Will not all men who have *judgments* to exercise, and *minds independent* enough to speak *truth*, without regard to interest, admit as their sincere

conviction that the *Bourbons* cannot remain without military protection; and yet that the creation of a *native* force would endanger their overthrow?

How can it be otherwise?

The *Bourbons* appearing as the *proconsuls* of the *foreigner*, were identified with all the humiliations, all the exactions, all the violences, all the broken promises of which the French nation complained.

To sooth irritation—to conciliate outraged feelings—to erase the impression of their having acted in concert with the foreigner in those grievous measures, was the policy which interest and duty dictated.

A *general amnesty*—an *inviolable charter*—the *nationalization* “of a family which (Napoleon so often said) had for *twenty-five* years been only known to France from their alliance with her enemies,” was requisite, and would have succeeded to eradicate all animosities, to have established unanimity amongst all classes, all

professions, all parties! The monarch might have obtained *allegiance*—the people *tranquillity*—and the state that *power* which it is the interest of all other powers she should possess. If Louis had but heard the language of wisdom, and nature's best feelings, he would have adopted a policy of oblivion and humanity: he would have acknowledged former reciprocal errors between the governors and governed, and sheathed the sword of Justice, if power can be called justice, when staining her ermine by an illegal exercise of the judicial functions*.

* The generous defender of *right*, from whose Letter extracts have already been made, thus at the same time acquits the *policy* which was unhappily rejected.

"The want of principle and consistency, and the disgusting changes of the Marshals, have, I know, steeled men's minds to their sufferings. This is natural enough: but when the violence of the times is gone by, and, above all, when the tomb has closed on their offences, the transaction will be judged with reference to the character of the contending party, and to the nature of the promise; not to the conduct or misconduct of the sufferers. *Non te dignum, Cherea; fecisti; nam si ego digna hæc contumeliâ sum maxime, at tu indignus qui faceres, tamen.*

"Nor is this all: if we judge by former instances, even the *crime itself* will be regarded with more indulgence by posterity than any *irregular* mode of punishing it. Allowance for individuals is made in all great changes. It is difficult, in sudden emergencies and great convulsions of state, especially for professional men, whose lives have

Instead of that system, the most sacred treaties were violated: *retrospective proscrip-*

been passed in camps, to weigh maturely all the considerations by which their conduct should, in the strict line of duty, be regulated: unforeseen cases arise; and men even of good principles and understanding, are hurried into acts of inconsistency and political immorality. History is full of such instances; and in our own, the name of one with whom no commander can dislike to be associated, brings them to our recollection. Marlborough abandoned in his king, his *benefactor* and *protector*; betrayed the person who placed great confidence in him, and did so when the opinions of his friends and party were, to say the least, divided, and not unanimously in favour of the steps he took.

"These men (the French) deserted a standard to which they were *recently, reluctantly, and barely* reconciled; under which they were regarded with *suspicion* by their government, with *hatred* and *reproach* by their fellow-soldiers; and they went over to their ancient companion in arms and victory; to one, from whom they had derived *rank, property, character, and importance*. They did so too, when *all the military feeling* of their country was decidedly in union with the cause they espoused. A stoic, a philosopher, a man whose public principles are *stronger* than his *private affections, gratitude, or vanity*, might, perhaps, have acted otherwise; and, from strict regard to his honour once given, have sacrificed his fortunes, his favour, and popularity, with those to whom he was obliged, to support a cause in which he found himself *engaged* against his interests and his inclinations. I own, however, that any military man, who was to lay his hand on his heart, and say that he would have done so, would give me a much higher opinion of his *present prudence* than of his *self-knowledge or candour*.

"In the latter view of the subject, I know I am some-

tions, in defiance of the charter, were lawlessly proposed, and the *Deity* outraged by an impious association of his name with the *infraction**.

Executions multiplied; and, as if the axe was too prompt a relief for the sufferer, and the public eye, *hands were previously struck off, whilst the wretched sufferers, with their bleeding stumps, were ranged on the scaffold to await the FURTHER operation of the executioner!*

what singular; few at present, make much allowances for the political tergiversations of the Marshals; and many, more indulgent than I am in their judgment of *political apostacy in England*, are quite outrageous with Frenchmen for not acting with inflexible principle in the most trying and difficult circumstances. Some, however, among the most indignant at their crimes, yet doubt the *justice, policy, and safety* of punishing them; and more, especially among the moderate of all parties, think the *claim of the capitulation conclusive*, or if not quite so, of a *nature questionable enough* to induce the contending parties, *for the preservation of their own and the national character*, to give it the construction most favourable to the weaker party.

"I have not spoken of Lavalette; all my arguments apply in his favour as strongly as in Ney's; and surely he is not, as others may be, the object of any bystander's indignation. He is an honourable man throughout."

* Vide *Richelieu's* speech in the Chamber of Peers, when he said that the will of God was visible in the determination to violate the charter; and, therefore, the King consented.

The punishment of parricide was applied to these unfortunate men, condemned on the charge of treason, but it was the first time that it had ever been inflicted, and the atrocity was aggravated by the accused not having been permitted to *confront* the *accuser*, a *creature of the police*, whose *written deposition* was *received in evidence**.

Such was the justice, tempered with mercy, that characterized the triumphs of *legitimacy*!

Since, however, the people of France, could not, any more than the people of Rome, be all decollated, laws authorizing arbitrary arrests were passed, and the prisons were choked with victims, many of whom are now, probably, rotting in solitary dungeons.

It would exceed the proposed limits of this work, to detail all the rueful absurdities, all the *unconstitutional* acts†, all the severities which

* Vide Trials, and reflect on the progressive abuses of the blood system.

† Vide Royal Ordonnance, when the illegality of the elections ordered by the King the preceding year, was acknowledged.

distinguished this epoch, and continued until the reviving strength of the oppressed compelled more circumspection, and some approach to those forms which are designed to guarantee the lives and fortunes of men from violence and injustice.

The result, however, of the system, which commenced by *octroying* the charter ; which re-established sovereignty on the ruins of good faith, and cemented it with the *blood* of her generals, has been, that a *line of separation* is drawn between the Bourbons and the French people, so that mutual confidence on a community of interest will perhaps never be established.

“ The nature of man must,” as an eminent writer has said, “ change before *voluntary* obedience can be obtained from *hatred*, or *homage* from *contempt*.”

The Bourbons and France being at variance, all political connexion between the *government* and *foreign* powers, which erects a system on the presumed co-operation of the *nation*, is and must be delusive to the *ally*.

France, unless she arrays an *hundred and fifty thousand* men, can be of no use to her allies; and if she does array them, then *one hundred and fifty thousand* men will too probably end, if they do not begin, by redressing their *own* wrongs.

What can be done with a government whose existence depends on the *coalition of Europe* for its support; and, if deprived of that *general* aid, and obliged to connect itself with some friendly powers, can offer no security, that the soldiers, when armed, will, *with arms in their hands*, obey the *royal authority*?

France, armed, would strike more terror into Austria, England, and Switzerland, than into Russia. *One* would fear for Italy; the *other* for the Scheldt; and the *third*, retaliation for injuries: Russia alone, from causes already assigned, has little to dread.

Would it however not be hazardous to place a *French* soldier in the presence of *Maria Louisa* and the *young Napoleon*; or in any country which might recall former *glory* to recollection?

The impetuous feelings of a nation goaded to madness by humiliations and all sorts of sufferings, and roused to action by the hope of successful revenge, are not to be resisted by any government; but yet it must be doubtful whether the Bourbons could buy a few months' precarious possession of the throne by compliance with the national impulse.

At all events, there is no view of the subject, where the danger is not more *positive* and *greater* than the projected good: and although volumes might be written, the same conclusion must be drawn, *that until France is restored to peace with herself—until her government can say “Toto certandum est corpore regni;”* as an ally she is *disqualified*; and the emasculation deprives the continent of *Europe* of the power to form a federative system of government, until a sovereign, as *Diogenes* said to the *Macedonian*, “can resemble the queen-bee, who rules without a sting: until good faith is the religion of his government, and justice and clemency are the guards of the throne, he may reign under the name of king, but his fears will make him a slave!”—*Nonne millies perire est melius quam in sua civitate sine at-*

*inimicorum presidio non posse vivere ? Sed nullum est
istuc mihi crede, presidium : suavitate et benevolentia
civium septum oportet esse, non armis.*

AUSTRIA.

After a pertinacious struggle of *twenty* years, *Austria*, overwhelmed by military losses and financial distress, seemed to have reached the climax of her ruin, when a *family alliance* with her conqueror re-established her in the attitude of a great European power.

The connexion with France was a measure of national policy; and the re-establishment of the House of Lorraine on the throne of France, at which throne all continental Europe bowed in homage, mitigated some of the bitterness of that feeling which preceding humiliations had engendered in the general mind of the nation.

The nobility, however, whose fortunes had been wrecked by the contest and the exactions of Napoleon, regarded this marriage as an additional mortification; and under that impression, the wounds that closed, were "festering all within."

Napoleon was not ignorant of this latent animosity ; and, when he invaded Russia, resolved to make a temporary sacrifice of the independence of *Poland*, to purchase the co-operation of *Austria*.

The issue of the Russian campaign, to which *Austria* so much contributed, that Napoleon might not accomplish his design to re-establish a Polish throne at Warsaw, elevated her into the position of *arbitrator* of the destinies of Europe. Abandoning however her position, she flung her sword into the scale of Russia, and *Germany*, following her example, was relieved from French dominion.

Chaining her policy to the course of events, without any attempt to build a system of her own, she saw the crown of France plucked from the brows of her *daughter* and *grandson*, without any effort to prevent its seizure.

Europe, or the *cabinets* of Europe, applauded the magnanimity of the sacrifice ; and if *Austria* for an *instant* felt it as such, she quickly found consolation in the spoil of the French empire.

No *national rights*, no *solemn engagements*, proved any obstacle to her claims of indemnity—*restitution* was not only made of all the provinces and countries wrested from her in the course of her wars, but Ragusa, Venice, and all the Venetian possessions, were surrendered to her by allies who had confederated to punish ambition and restore the *independence* and *liberties* of subjugated states.

The division of Switzerland, and the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to the Austrian monarchy, would have been superadded ; but *Alexander* interposed, and the memoirs to prove the Austrian titles to these further acquisitions, were returned to the archives of Vienna.

In pursuing this system of aggrandizement, Francis certainly did not consider that he was acting in the spirit of that usurpation which Europe had risen against and overthrown.

Personally beloved by his own subjects, for the benignity of his character and the mildness of his reign, he forgot that he was not immortal, and that nations preferred the security of self-

government to the precarious exercise of despotic authority. He also did not bear in mind that example was contagious and fatal, when supplying precedents for the abuse of power.

It is true he now extends his rule over *twenty-eight millions* of people ; that the Austrian navy now rides in the Adriatic ; but is not this the plumage of a day, adorning the imperial bird, but not supporting him in his flight ? Are those *twenty-eight millions* united by interest and voluntary allegiance, or rather are not above *eight millions* of Gallicians, Montenegrins, Ragusans, and Italians, retained in subjection by force ? and are not as many more exposed to seduction by the sacrifice of their prosperity under a partial and false system of political economy* ?

Is Russia, Slavonian Russia, Greek Russia, Cosmopolite Russia, with her *six hundred and forty thousand* men on the Danube, the Pruth, the Bug, and the Warta, with Poland as her ad-

* Hungary contains near *seven millions* of inhabitants.

vanced guard, and Prussia as her partizan, not more formidable to Austria in perpetuity, than Napoleon ever was—and this too without removing the just cause of her former alarm? for France, though now muzzled, is “as the lion’s whelp, refusing to exemplify the patience of the ass couching between burdens*.” In case of war with Russia, can *three hundred and fifty thousand* men, the most Austria could ever array, form a sufficient rampart for the protection of her frontier against the invader, and guard over her southern subjects?

Unmoored from France by the deposition of the Lorraine dynasty, and the state of that country already developed, can she ride with confidence at a single anchor?

Bankrupt in credit, as indigent of wealth, where can she obtain any pecuniary aid in her necessity? The Bourbons could borrow, Russia can procure money, but where can Austria negotiate another *Imperial loan*?

* Vide the blessing of Judah and Issachar, book of Genesis.

Without England as her treasury, without France as her reserve, with a volcano under her feet, and a belt of Russian bayonets indenting her frontier, is her situation improved by the new political system of Europe, to the degree that it might have been, if she had preferred solidity to aggrandizement ?

When she agreed to break the ties which connected the government and people of France with her interests, was she wise to establish the right of the strongest as the public law of Europe ?

As the protectress of minor states, she would have been invigorated by their corresponding efforts ; participating in the act of their extinction, she has divided with England all the odium, and has been a party to her own degradation.

The Austrians, are a kind and excellent people, but they were never popular*, because the poverty, or, in some cases, the simulated pover-

* Except in the Tyrol, where the people would submit to no taxation ; and therefore Austria was very indifferent about the recovery of that province.

ty of their government requiring heavy exactions, gave them the character of extortioners in countries where they governed.

They made themselves no friends in the more civilized parts of Europe, for they never conformed themselves to the spirit of the age*; but now they have excited an ill will from a combination of errors and disappointed hopes, which facilitate the operations of hostile cabinets, and which, if not soothed and quickly soothed, will prepare the way for greater misfortunes:

Austria is naturally the promontory, which forms the advanced bulwark of Europe against the North; but *until France can again be connected with the line of defence*, until the Carpathian mountains are linked to the Alps, by friendly

* All these observations apply to the *system*, not to the individuals acting under it. In the late war Schwartzenberg and Bellegarde did every thing that could be done to conciliate public feeling, and did it with natural benignity as well as good policy. The officers of their armies adopted the same line of conduct, but the necessities of the state counteracted all their partial efforts. They mitigated the evil; but as they could not supply the treasury, Burke's observation, that "it is no more given to man to tax and to please, than to love and be wise," was here verified.

countries as well as governments, she cannot provide for her own security, much less charge herself with the maintenance of the European balance of power.

The minister of Austria, a man of eminent talent, and who has indisputably done much for his country, is said to boast "that his cabinet never indulges imagination in politics;" but it would be well if it also had remembered Fortune has wings as well as hands; that when she stretches forth one, she spreads the other; and if her caress is slighted, she flits away, nor can prayers nor art prevail on her to return.

TURKEY.

This is a state, against whose existence civilization *en masse* would long since have marched, had not the safety of neighbouring states been compromised by its dissolution.

When Turkey ceased to be a conquering power—when there was no longer any apprehension of her substituting through Europe, the Koran for the Gospel; Sweden, Poland, Aus-

tria, France, and England, at various epochs courted her alliance, and rendered her contributive to the balance of power.

The partition of Poland, however, broke the chain which grappled her to European policy; and since that event, she has been gradually isolating, and obliged to buy her repose with sacrifices that rendered its duration less probable.

Turkey, however, had an opportunity in the year 1813, to recover a line of defence, which might have afforded some protection: she signed, nevertheless, a treaty, which placed her still more at the mercy of Russia; and although she was aware of her error before the wax was cold, no temptation could induce her to violate her good faith.

The Divan was not insensible to the danger of Turkey, under any result of the Russian invasion; in their opinion the success of either power was equally fatal to the Ottoman interests.

They did not, however, foresee that Russia would not in the first instance fulfil the condi-

tions of a treaty, which had been so advantageous to her: they had even flattered themselves, that Russia would have generously restored all the cessions they had so gratuitously and improvidently made.

But although their treatment gives them the right of war, or rather of the renewal of hostilities (for between Turkey and Russia it may be said "*bellum semper manet, pugna cessat*"): still the very violations, by the offensive power they would supply to Russia, render submission more necessary.

Turkey has altogether *twenty-two millions* of nominal subjects*—*twelve* in Europe, and *ten* in Asia: of these, however, *two millions and a half* are Egyptians, a people who never serve in the armies; and above *four millions* are Greeks, who are only employed on board the ships of war, where they must fight, or lose their heads by the scymitars of the petty officers.

* Le Sage gives *twenty-eight millions*; but this calculation is as much above the calculation of other geographers, as his Russian census is below theirs.

It is true, every Turk is a soldier, and a brave one; but he is ungovernable, and therefore an easy conquest.

The Turks have not only to resist the Russians on the Danube, and in Armenia; but they have to keep in subjection the Greek population, and suppress rebellion amongst themselves; which, like the flame on the mountain of Deliktash*, is never extinguished, although it never expands so as to threaten general destruction.

It is true, that Sultan Mahmoud is a man of ability and instruction, having, whilst in his prison awaiting the succession to the throne†,

*** Captain Beaufort, whose Travels in Caramania afford a trait of British humanity most honourable to himself and country, when he suffered not the unfeeling calculations of prudence to permit *sixty* unfortunate Turks to be massacred in cold blood in sight of a British flag, notices this mountain, of which Pliny made mention, and from collateral circumstances suggests, that the stories now in circulation about Moosa Dagli (the Mountain of Moses), which is immediately contiguous to Deliktash, may have some fanciful connexion with the story in Exodus, of the burning bush on Mount Horeb!**

† The lot of all the heirs apparent in that country.

been educated by the unfortunate Selim in the duties of government*.

Mahmoud has also shown great courage and presence of mind; qualities highly essential, when Janissaries with swords in hand sometimes appear unsummoned in his councils. But what can be done with a tumultuous people, whose obstinacy is equal to their ignorance, and whose energies will submit to no regulation and discipline?

To urge Turkey into war, is to counsel her to destruction. There are certainly some means of resistance left, which rashness would render unavailable.

Time is now her only salvation: if she profits by that time, to organize *inoffensively* a system of defence suitable to the exigency of her

* The fate of Selim is universally regretted in Turkey; and the Janissaries, even in the Seraglio, now sing constantly the song which he made the day before his death, and in which he pathetically describes his misfortunes; declares, that the good of his country influenced all his actions; and makes an appeal to the people, deprecating their cruelty, inasmuch as he was the agent of a destiny directing their welfare.

position, it may yet be some years before a *Te Deum* is sung in Saint Sophia. But "if she does not well choose the beginning and onset of things, if she is deceived with long shadows, so as to shoot off before the enemy is tangible, she may teach dangers to come on by over-early buckling towards them."

Mahmoud must cover the turban with the helmet of Pluto, "making the politic man go invisible," until he can carry his councils into execution; or, if previously attacked, trust to despair, which, by giving strength to fanaticism, may afford means to preserve the throne of barbarism.

ENGLAND.

Two parties divide England.

One is of opinion that continental connexion is injurious to her interests, and fatal to her liberties; the other proclaims, that not a cannon should be fired in Europe without the reply of one charged by British subsidies, and that military glory is of more value than constitutional freedom.

It would not be difficult to prove the position of the one party.

Eight hundred millions of funded, and *sixty-four millions* of unfunded debt, *eight millions* of annual poor rates*, and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus in *time of peace*, are axioms which no logic can overthrow.

The other party, if they could find guineas, would doubtless proceed in their rage for laurels as the Dutchmen did for tulips, until the native soil threatened to yield nothing but noxious plants manured with blood, and moistened by the tears of a famishing people; but the ability to pursue their ventures is regulated by the supply of money, which can be procured for exportation to foreign cabinets.

There is no want of political hypothesis to form plans of action. Sir Home Popham's telegraph cannot make more changes than Europe can offer convolutions to the speculative eye of a state geometrician, who, unrestrained

* With contributions, loans, &c. perhaps this year nearer twelve millions.

by the ancient doctrines of independence, rights of nations, and treaties, forms his political system on the basis of square miles and capitation taxes.

It is, however, fortunate for humanity that subsidies are at last preventive checks: England can engage in no *fancy* wars; the first gun, by obliging the minister of finance to borrow, whilst he at the same time would be compelled to fund *sixty-four millions* of Exchequer bills, at a loss of between *twenty* and *thirty* per cent. would blow up the whole system of public credit; and as no government can pretend to confine the concussion to that catastrophe, as no man can foresee the effect such an event might have on all the establishments, and all the property of the country; the temple of Janus must be kept shut, notwithstanding the disappointment of contractors and glory-hunters.

Defensive war for the rights of England is quite another consideration; the tender of lives and fortunes would be no "mouth profession" against any attempt made, insidiously, or sword in hand, on her independence, or what remains

of her liberties, if the nation were allowed to protect them.

Every Englishman would, like Rostopchin, when he placed the torch to the curtains of his marriage-bed to fire a splendid palace, solicit the sacrifice of all he could offer on the altar of his country, even if, like Rostopchin, he thought it might be beneficial only by example.

There is no doubt, that it was the interest of England to have conciliated France, and ingratiated herself in the esteem of her people.

When Russia became a great and commanding European power, jealousy of the ascendancy of France ought to have existed no longer; for France alone could offer an efficient equipoise: but to *ally* England to a *government*, and declare *war* against the *nation*, was justifiable by no policy, on no principle, and by no precedent.

In the reign of Louis XIV. when ideas of prerogative, of *legitimacy*, and *divine right*, were at their climax of folly, there was no attempt to control the will of the people in this country.

Cardinal Mazarin, the prime minister, not only acknowledged the government, but even courted the alliance of Cromwell! Whatever might have been his motive, *the principle of national right in the choice of the form of government*, and of the chief of that government, was sanctioned by his conduct.

When Cromwell died, his successor was acknowledged; when the Stuarts returned, they were also recognised as sovereigns by all foreign states. When James and his dynasty were declared to have forfeited the crown by *withdrawing* from England, and for being *unworthy* of it in Scotland, William the Third was involved in no dispute with France about the *legitimacy* of his rights. It is true, that these pretenders, James and his son, received assistance from France; but the object of that assistance was not to strengthen the claims of James, but to weaken the power of England.

Thus a government, which permitted no right of its *own* subjects, whose power was not founded on any prescribed fixed contract between the governor and governed, but where

even the *will* of the King was considered to be *law*, nevertheless respected the rights of a rival nation; whilst the government of a nation which cannot dispute the right of election of a first magistrate to be vested in the people, without giving the throne back to the Stuart dynasty, first declares to the French people, through her General, "that it can treat with no government, but that of Louis XVIII.;" and then in a *public treaty* proclaims that it appropriates a *British army* to the *service of the King of France* for *operations against his people at his own request*.

At Vienna, on the 12th of May 1815, the ministers of the allied powers drew up a declaration, which they published to Europe, stating, "that the governments they represented, knew too well the principles which should guide them in their relations with an *independent country*, to attempt (as they had been accused) any *imposition of laws upon it*, to *meddle with its internal affairs*, to *assign it any form of government*, or to give rulers in compliance with the interests or passions of its neighbours."

Lord Clancarty, when communicating this act, observed, in his official dispatch—"In this war the sovereigns do not propose to *interfere with any lawful rights* of the French people. They have no intention to *oppose the right* which this nation *has to choose the form of government* it thinks suitable, nor to *trespass in any manner* on its *independence* as a *great and free people*."

To make assurance doubly sure, or to accomplish the machinations then planned, the English minister, in a dispatch, dated "Foreign Office, London, April 25, 1815," writes, "But this treaty must not be considered as binding on his Britannic Majesty to continue the war with the object of *imposing on France any particular form of government*, whatever may be the anxiety of the Prince Regent to see His Most Christian Majesty restored to the throne."

Austria echoed the British sentiment, and in a note dated Vienna, May 4, 1815, proclaimed, that "the Emperor, although irrevocably resolved to direct all his efforts against the usurpation of Napoleon Buonaparte (as this object had been expressed in the third article

of the treaty of the 25th of March), is nevertheless convinced, that the *duty* imposed on him by the interests of his subjects and his own *principles*, will not permit his continuation of the war, to impose on *France any government whatsoever.*"

After these solemn professions, conveyed in such unequivocal language, and sustained not only by a variety of manifestoes and proclamations, but by the *most formal pledges* in the *British parliament*, who does not feel an honest confusion and blush at the prostitution of his country's faith, when he reads in Maceroni's work, pages 43, 44, and 50, that "the restoration of *Louis* was a '*sine quâ non*' with the *British ministers* ? for no commander would have dared, on his own authority, to have charged himself with such a criminal responsibility ; but to prevent the possibility of such a suspicion, these ministers did not only *sanction* the act, but they *further* negotiated and signed a convention, which in the following words engaged to maintain by the bayonets of Englishmen in *opposition* to the French senate and people, *Louis and the form of government so forcibly established** :

* To prove that the government of Louis was *forcibly* esta-

“ ‘ The allied sovereigns have, nevertheless, in consideration of the high interest which induces them to *strengthen* the authority of the *legitimate* sovereign, promised to His Most Christian Majesty, to *support him with their arms* against all revolutionary convulsion tending to overturn by force the state of things actually established, and which would thus threaten anew the tranquillity of Europe.

“ ‘ But not forgetting, that, *under the variety of shapes* in which the revolutionary spirit may still show itself in France, there might be doubts as to what cases might require the *interference of a foreign force* ; and being well aware of the difficulty of giving precise instructions applicable to each particular case, the allied sovereigns have thought it most advisable to confide in the known prudence and discretion of the Duke of Wellington, the determination of the *time and mode in which it would be proper*

blished, the Declaration of the Representatives solemnly assembled on the 5th of July, is added : vide document at the end of the work.—Exclusive of this document there was the Protest already alluded to, against the closing of the Chambers, and which may be produced hereafter.

to employ the troops under his orders, in a full confidence that he will in no case act without having previously concerted his measures with his Majesty the King of France, and that he will acquaint, as soon as possible, the allied sovereigns with the motives which have engaged him to take his determinations.' "

If this had been the act of Ministers alone, then, indeed, there would be ground for reproach, but not for surprise.

Ministers who could break faith with Genoa, Italy, and Naples, who could permit, if not directly assist, the overthrow of the Cortes, destroy the independent republic of Ragusa, which even the Turks had respected from the foundation of their European power*; who could propose a repartition of Poland, sanction the dismemberment of Saxony, *under the plea of*

* Vide an animated appeal from Count de Bettera Wodopich, a noble Ragusan, accompanied with a protest of the senate, against the act by which the independence of this republic was annihilated. And for a faithful and most eloquent exposition of the state of Europe, vide Henry Brougham's memorable speech in Parliament on the 13th March, 1817.

inflicting a chastisement on a king, for doing that which had been done by all the partitioning sovereigns themselves; who could starve Norway, and be guilty of other manifold outrages against good faith, good sense, and the freedom of their own, as well as every other country: such ministers might indeed be supposed capable of such a proceeding. But that a British Parliament, however subject that Parliament may have been for many years to ministerial influence, should have sanctioned the measure, is a frightful symptom of decaying patriotism, and extinguished constitutional principles*.

* A foreign minister said, the measure itself never met with any objection from the British negotiators; but as the British Parliament was *fastidious* about words, the *diplomatic grammarians* had been obliged to give more than ordinary attention to the *language* of this treaty of co-operation.

The Protest of Lord Holland will rescue himself and friends, for they all concurred in his sentiments, from the opprobrium as legislators; but it does not, and nothing can, redeem the national character. It is, however, too important a document not to be cited whenever this subject is discussed.

Protest of Lord Holland in the House of Peers, against the Address in approbation of Treaties, on the 19th of February.

"Because the treaties and engagements contain a direct guarantee of the present government of France against the

It is not meant that England should have made a crusade *against* Louis. If the people had chosen him and his family, he would have been *entitled* to his throne; and resistance to that choice would then have been as criminal in opposing Louis, as it now is in supporting him with a *Janissary force*.

If the people of France were still to choose him, or confirm him by *voluntary* allegiance, from that moment he would become the *legitimate* King of France, because he would hold his crown *from* and *for* the people. England could *prescribe* or *proscribe* no foreign dynasty without establishing a principle adverse to her own constitutional rights, and without an abuse of power, which may one day prove fatal to her own liberties*.

people of that country; and, in my judgment, imply a general and perpetual guarantee of all European governments against the governed. I hold such a design to be *unlawful*, I believe it to be impracticable; and recollecting the principles on which the Revolution in 1688, and the succession of the House of Hanover were founded, I cannot give the sanction of my vote to a system, which if it had prevailed in those times, might have deprived this kingdom of all the benefits that have resulted from a national government and a free constitution.—VASSALL HOLLAND."

* No words can better prove the cruelty of the system,

England already has lost the world's homage; no longer is she esteemed "the friend

as it affects individuals, in which this false step has involved the Allies, than those which were used by the writer of the following letter. Circumstances rendered this letter an *official* document; its publication may trespass on feminine delicacy; but such an example of conjugal affection and fidelity is too honourable to woman, and beneficial in its effects on society, to be withheld from farther publicity.

Literal Translation of a Letter, written after the Battle of Waterloo, by the Queen of Westphalia, to her Father, the King of Wirtemberg.

"SIRE AND FATHER,

"Your Majesty requested me to descend this morning into your apartment. For the first time in my life I declined the happiness of being in your presence: I knew the subject of the interview; and fearing that my mind might not be sufficiently collected, I have dared to take the liberty of developing the motives of my conduct, and making an appeal to your paternal affection.

"Your Majesty knows the whole truth. Yes, Sire, the Prince Jerome, your son-in-law, my husband and the father of my child, is with me! Yes, Sire! I have withdrawn an instant from the palace of my King, to succour the husband to whom my life is attached. My thoughts have accompanied him to the war—my care has preserved him in a long and painful journey, where his existence was often menaced. My arms have embraced him in his misfortune with more tenderness than even in the time of our prosperity!

"The Prince Jerome is not the husband of my own choice. I received him from your hand, when his house reigned over great kingdoms—when his head wore a crown.

of the oppressed;" her promises have become a scoff and a by-word: she has alienated the

Soon the sentiments of my heart cherished and confirmed the bonds which your policy had commanded.

" Marriage and nature impose duties which are not subject to the vicissitudes of fortune: I know their extensive obligations, and I know also how to fulfil them: I was a queen—I am still a wife and a mother! The change of policy among princes, in overthrowing the French empire, has also destroyed the throne, on which your goodness, and the Prince my husband, had seated me. We were obliged to submit to the force of circumstances! The august Maria Louisa afforded me a great example of resignation; but our situation is dissimilar. Public interests may command sacrifices of permanent duration, or which may cease when the interests of a new policy render other changes inevitable.

" Although chance has elevated us above the generality of mankind, we are much more to be pitied. A variable will controls our destiny; but there its power ceases—it is impotent against the obligations Providence imposes on us.

" The husband which God and you yourself gave me—the child whom I have borne in my bosom—comprise my existence. I have shared a throne with this husband, I will partake with him exile and misfortune: violence alone shall separate me from him. But, O my King! O my father! I know your heart, your justice, and the excellence of your principles: I know what these principles have been at all times on the subject of those domestic duties which should be respected by the Princes of your House.

" I do not ask your Majesty, from affection for me, to make any change in that system of conduct which has been adopted in conformity with the determinations of the most powerful Princes of Europe; but I throw myself at your feet to implore permission that my husband and myself may remain near your person: but, O my father! if that must

*After the Revolution
- 1960s*
good-will even of those she assisted in their usurpations; and where her cause once engaged thousands of voluntary champions, not one apologist is now to be found.

There is not an Englishman on the Continent, who has not been the object of insult, if not of execration.

England, by her money, enabled Europe to combine and march against France; her assistance is acknowledged, but not with gratitude; such a sentiment would not have been excited, if her assistance had been considered as disinterested; for, as Tacitus justly says,

not be, let us at least be restored to your favour before we remove to a foreign soil. It is only after having received some proof of your paternal love, that I can feel strength sufficient to appear before you. If we must go this very evening, let us depart with the assurance of your affection and protection in a happier time. Our misfortunes must have a period: policy will not always command in respect to us that which is humiliating, nor delight in the ruin and degradation of so many Princes, acknowledged in former treaties, and who have been allied to the most ancient and illustrious houses of Europe. Is not their blood mingled with ours? Pardon me, my father and my Sovereign! for having thus expressed myself; but condescend, by a single word, to let me know that it has not been received with displeasure."

Beneficia eo usque laeta sunt dum videntur exsolvi posse, at ubi multum antevenere, pro gratiâ odium redditur ; but, on the contrary, her benefits are supposed to have originated from motives of mere self-interest, and, as such, to be destitute of all claim on European gratitude. Various powers feel that England also attaches herself to rival governments, not to preserve what she calls the balance of power, but to control the continental policy, and continue an exclusion from what they claim as a due share of maritime advantages.

Hence that jealousy of any returning prosperity to England, since that prosperity would afford stronger means to enforce these obnoxious checks : hence, the desire to deprive England of the presumed sources of her wealth : hence, the pleasure felt at the augmentation of the naval power of America (for, although America might not be able for years to do what one of her Presidents once said she would do, “ draw a line of demarcation with her fleets, beyond which no European flag should be seen without a passport ; ” still it is well known, that every single ship of the line built by America, re-

quires, in case of war, a counteracting expenditure on the part of England, equal to the maintenance of *three* sail: that as the American marine increases, the English West India islands will require more garrisons, and the communications with India become more precarious); and hence, perhaps, those negotiations which have been carrying on from the quarter-deck of the Washington in the Mediterranean, as well as the preference lately shown to the American flag in the Baltic. Envy is not blind, and revenge never sleeps.

The utterance of these truths may offend, but silence would injure: the hearing of them is painful, but will be of use; therefore, as the philosopher said to his angry master, "Strike, but hear."

If England is true to herself, she may yet avoid shipwreck; but if she looks to preservation by connexion with France in *her present state*, and continental operations, involving her in war with Russia, which prudence might avoid without diminution of her power or prejudice to her interests; her guns of distress

will soon be heard along her possessions in every quarter of the globe.

.. England is an island, and she must return to the remembrance that she is one ; she perishes if she does not adopt an insular policy, and a truly British system ; she must withdraw her troops from the continent, attend to her naval power, and negotiate with the trident in her hand. She must moreover economize her expenses until she can appropriate, not an imaginary but a real sinking fund to the payment of her debts ; and above all she must re-establish her people in the enjoyment of that freedom which has been the source of her former happiness, and the soul of her energies and greatness.

No hostile policy could then endanger her safety, whilst general respect would replace her in peace with mankind. Her Secretaries of State would be no longer the arbitrary gaolers of her citizens ; nor the sea be covered with an emigrant population, flying from persecution and famine.

Let her government be vigilant guardians of the laws, but let them not encourage that pernicious crew, the scourge and bane of society, who are now let loose with the wages of iniquity in view, to harass and destroy their fellow-citizens.

It behoves those who guide the councils of the state, for their own sake, to gain the affections and confidence of the people by a relinquishment of that system which has estranged their attachment, and deprived authority of respect. Mankind is no longer in slavish ignorance; and the governments which have encouraged education, must accompany the boon with a liberal attention to the rights of the community. After so many sacrifices in *war*, the people may fairly claim the enjoyment of their privileges in *peace*; and the greatest of all their privileges is liberty—it is peace itself. *Pax est tranquilla libertas—Servitus malorum omnium postremum, non modo bello sed morte etiam repellendum.*

Document adverted to in p. 187.

CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES,

President—COUNT LANJUINAIS,

July 5, 1817.

*Déclaration des Droits des Français et des Principes
fondamentaux de leur Constitution.*

Art. 1^{er}. Tous les pouvoirs émanent du peuple ; la souveraineté du peuple se compose de la réunion des droits de tous les citoyens.

2. La division des pouvoirs est le principe le plus nécessaire à l'établissement de la liberté et à sa conservation.

3. La puissance législative en France, se compose de trois pouvoirs toujours distincts dans leurs élémens et dans leur action ; une chambre des représentans, une chambre haute et un monarque.

4. Dans la confection des lois, la proposition, la sanction et l'opposition appartiennent également aux trois branches de la puissance législative. La loi n'existe que par leur accord. A la chambre des représentans, exclusivement, appartient l'initiative en trois matières : les contributions publiques, les levées d'hommes et l'élection d'une nouvelle dynastie à l'extinction de la dynastie régnante.

5. L'action du pouvoir exécutif ne s'exerce que par des ministres, tous responsables solidairement pour les déterminations prises en commun ; chacun en particulier, pour les actes particuliers de son département.

6. Le monarque est inviolable, sa personne est sacrée. En cas de violation des lois et d'attentat contre la liberté et la sûreté individuelle ou publique, *les ministres sont mis en accusation par la chambre des représentans* ; ils sont jugés par la chambre-haute.

7. La liberté de chaque individu consiste à pouvoir faire ce qui ne nuit pas à autrui. *Aucune atteinte ne peut y être et portée qu'au nom des lois, par leurs organes et sous des formes assez précises pour ne pas être éludées ou négligées.*

8. La liberté de la presse est inviolable. *Aucun écrit ne peut être soumis à une censure préalable. Les lois déterminent quels sont les abus de la presse assez graves pour être qualifiés crimes ou délits.* Ils sont réprimés suivant les différens degrés de gravité, par des peines, dont la sévérité sera aussi graduée, et par *jugement de jurés.*

9. Chacun a liberté de professer ses opinions religieuses, et obtient la même protection pour son culte.

10. L'indépendance des tribunaux est garantie.

Les juges des cours de justice et des tribunaux civils sont inamovibles et à vie. *En matière criminelle, les débats sont publics*, le fait est jugé par des jurés, et la loi appliquée par des jugés.

11. Une instruction primaire, indispensable pour la connaissance des droits et des devoirs de l'homme en société, est mise gratuitement à portée des toutes les classes du peuple.

Les élémens des sciences, des belles-lettres et des beaux-arts, sont enseignés dans de hautes écoles.

12. La constitution garantit l'égalité des droits civils et politiques, l'abolition de la noblesse, des privilèges, des qualifications féodales, des dîmes, des droits féodaux et de la confiscation des biens. Elle garantit le droit de pétition, les secours publics, l'inviolabilité des propriétés et de la dette publique, l'irrevocabilité de l'aliénation des domaines nationaux de toute origine, et l'égalité proportionnelle dans la répartition des contributions ; *elle garantit enfin le main-*

tion de la légion-d'honneur, des couleurs nationales et des récompenses pour les services civils et militaires.

Elle ne reconnaît point les ordres monastiques et les vœux perpétuels.

13. Le prince soit héréditaire, soit appelé par election, ne montera sur le trône de France qu'après avoir prêté et signé le serment d'observer et de faire observer la présente déclaration.

La présente déclaration sera communiquée par un message à la chambre des pairs et à la commission de gouvernement.

La déclaration est unanimement adoptée.

Au même instant les cris de *Vive la Nation* se font entendre de toutes parts, au milieu des applaudissemens de l'assemblée et des tribunes.

*M. Dupin**. Je demande que la résolution soit sur-le-champ envoyée à la chambre des pairs. Il faut qu'on sache que la représentation nationale toute entière partage les nobles sentimens exprimés dans la déclaration ; il faut que tout ce qu'il y a d'honnêtes gens, d'hommes raisonnables, d'amis d'une liberté sage, sachent que leurs vœux ont trouvé ici des interprètes, ET QUE LA FORCE ELLE-MEME NE POURRAIT NOUS EMPECHER DE LES EMETTRE.

* The generous and eloquent defender of Messrs. Wilson, Bruce, and Hutchinson.

GEOGRAPHICAL MEMORANDUM.

Previous to the treaty of Vienna, Bucharest, and Teflis, Russia was composed of *fifty-seven* governments, extending over a space of *nine hundred and twenty thousand square leagues*, being the *ninth* part of the Terra Firma, and the *twenty-eighth* of the whole globe*. The Roman empire in the time of its greatest dominion, never equalled European Russia in extent, and European Russia is but a *third* of the whole Russian empire.

The population, however, is concentrated in European Russia, since, of the computed *forty-two millions* of Russian inhabitants, not above *five* are Asiatic, and in the *seven* governments surrounding the government of Moscow, which government itself contains *one million one hundred and thirty-nine thousand*, there are, according to the statement of Le Sage†, whose calculations

* The American settlements are not included.

† Governments round Moscow, from Le Sage's Table.

Twer,	904,000 I.	Vladimir,	871,000 I.
Smolensk,	892,000 I.	Riasan,	869,000 I.
Kaluga,	771,000 I.	Tula,	876,000 I.
Yaroslaw,	766,000 I.		

are far below the real amount, above *six millions* of inhabitants. It must also be remarked, that the extreme distance of any part of these *seven governments* is not more than *three hundred miles* from the city of Moscow, and the average distance of their frontiers is about *two hundred and fifty*,

In the year 1799, Tooke calculated, after the Greek tables, that Russia contained *forty millions* of inhabitants: Storck, at the end of the *eighteenth century*, computed the population at *thirty-six millions*: Sablowski, in his Geography of Russia, rates it at *forty-one millions*; and in his Statistics, at *forty-four*; and the St. Petersburg Almanack for 1808, makes the number *forty-two millions*. Since that period Alexander has added *one hundred and ninety-three thousand eight hundred* geographical square miles to the empire, including the Duchy of Warsaw, Finland, Georgia, &c.; and therefore the estimate of *forty-two millions* of present population is probably several millions too low. Malthus admits the tendency to increase to be very great, especially in Siberia; and the increased price of corn, &c. proves his supposition to be founded on truth.

In a work by C. T. Herman, from the Memoirs of the Petersburg Academy, published in 1811, there is much minute detail relative to the population of Russia. The author had access to all the official reports, and the Government has long been employed in obtaining accurate *revisions*, or census tables.

.. He states that there were of *peasants* in the several *tax* lists, and therefore probably less than the real amount :

In 1796	- -	15,718,088 males.
1800	- -	15,707,781
1801	- -	15,747,379
1802	- -	15,895,608
1803	- -	15,824,287
1804	- -	15,806,778

While the sum total of the enumerations of 1804 amounted to 41,253,488 inhabitants, which included a progress of population during ten years of 1,250,000 individuals, at the calculation of only *one fourth* of the surplus of births above deaths (amounting annually to *five hundred thousand*), reaching the age of eighteen or twenty,

Again he states :

“ According to these data the progress of population in Russia, produced partly by the improvement in the interior, partly by new acquisitions, has been as follows :

In 1772 . 14 millions.

1742 . 16 . . . after 20 years.

1762 . 19 . . . after 20

1782 . 28 . . . after 20

1796 . 36 . . . after 14

1806 . 41 . . . after 10

Of which *forty-one millions, thirteen millions* have been acquired in Little Russia, the Swedish, Polish, and Turkish provinces.

“ The indigenous population of Russia has thus more than doubled during the last century; whilst Smith supposes that the population in civilized countries only doubles once in *five hundred* years.

“ It has doubled in consequence of a better regulated administration; of the saving which the government has procured to the nation—of the capitals of foreigners placed in the country, and which for a long time constituted the

soul of the commerce in the interior; in consequence of the progress of national industry, which was the result of the increase of knowledge; by new commercial connexions with the other countries of Europe; and by the means of instruction furnished by the government to the inhabitants of Russia; and, finally, in consequence of the removal of several obstacles which opposed the progress of industry, as the abolition of the *douanes* of the interior, under the reigns of Elizabeth and Catherine, the improvement of roads, and the multiplication of canals."

He then presumes that the population of Russia will remain a long time between *forty-one* and *forty-three millions*; but he adds: "Unforeseen circumstances (exclusive of conquest) may give a considerable population to the south of Russia: for example, the astonishing commerce of grain at Odessa, between 1800 and 1805 (much augmented latterly), increased the value of all the lands as far as Kiow, and even the fertile Steppes were cultivated. Workmen were wanting, and half the produce was offered to those who would gather in the other half. The commerce of Taganrock likewise furnishes

ground for hope; and agriculture appears to be making progress amongst the Nomades."

He concludes by observing that

"A country is not sufficiently peopled when the demand for workmen, and the means of maintaining them, are excessive, as in some of the southern parts of Russia. A country suffers from its population, *when the thousands of rich are obliged to maintain the millions of poor. Such an abusive population must either perish, or leave the country, or produce revolutions.*

REVENUE.

The revenue of Russia is difficult to ascertain, but her exports some years since in corn, masts, flax, tallow and hides, furs, skins, iron, copper, and salt, &c. &c. &c. amounted to between *five and six millions sterling*; and it was supposed that the revenue averaged about *twelve millions sterling annually*; which, considering the difference in the value of money between England and Russia, is *more than equal* to all the necessities of the state, when the debt is discharged, and which is now in a course of liquidation.

This revenue is the more solid, because it is not, as in England, and in other countries, the produce of an excessive taxation*.


The paper rouble is always at a discount ; but such was the confidence of the Russians at Moscow, when the enemy had taken the capital, that it was at no greater discount there than at Petersburg, nor did the sight of gold make the least impression on the seller, so as to reduce the price demanded.

Copper is the chief coin; but the copper pieces called copecks are of great size and weight, though they are *forty* to a shilling. Vast quantities of ducats are also in circulation, and may be had to any amount in exchange against paper.

* In the Ukase, dated St. Petersburg, April 10, 1817, Alexander, when promulgating the new regulations for the discharge of the public debt, uses these remarkable words, which must excite the envy and wonder of every other European state : " After a war as fatal in its origin as glorious in its result, by the aid of the Almighty (and British subsidies) this war has been concluded *without any augmentation of the taxes*, and without having injured public credit."

THE END.

SSIA, in the Year 1817.





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
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